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SUMMARY 
 
Employers often wrestle with whether or not to suspend an employee and the issue is what 
needs to be done before an employee could be suspended. Suspending an employee means 
to deprive him or her from entering the work place for a period of time, due to alleged 
misconduct which, due to the nature of the alleged misconduct and in the opinion of the 
employer,  warrants the employee not to be in or near the workplace. 
 
Section 23 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, affords every employee the 
right to fair labour practices and this right should be affected by the Labour Relations Act, 
1995 (LRA).  Unfortunately the LRA only deals with the unfair suspension under the definition 
of an unfair labour practice in section 186(2) by stating that the meaning of unfair labour 
practice is any act or omission that arises between an employer and an employee involving 
the unfair suspension of an employee or any other unfair disciplinary action short of dismissal 
in respect of an employee. 
 
The focus of this document thus is to scrutinise the lack of legislative guidelines relating to the 
procedural fairness of suspension of employees.  It would thus necessitate an overview of the 
nature of suspension which would be discussed in length by way of referring to the right to 
suspend an employee as well as the application of the courts in such cases, the distinction 
between suspension as a preventative, or as a punitive measure and the possibility of 
suspension resulting in an unfair labour practice.  The distinction between preventative and 
punitive suspensions are highlighted.  
 
Since it is not clear when, how and for how long an employee may be suspended, in the 
absence of clear guidelines, employers have to turn to the courts’ interpretation to get the 
necessary guidance on the application of a suspension.  In order to ensure that the employer, 
experiencing unnecessary difficulty with the implementation of procedural fairness of 
suspensions, in a meaningful way, be assisted by the proposal that legislature consider to 
address this by including clear guidelines under Item 3 of Schedule 8 of the LRA.    
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In a significant survey on Poverty done by Peter Townsend in the United Kingdom has 
revitalised the suggestion that there should be a “legally enforceable right to work” for everyone 
over the age of required education,1
 
  “with a corresponding obligation on the part of employers, 
the government and especially local authorities, to provide alternative types of employment”. A 
conclusion reached from experimental studies indicates that there is a methodical connotation 
between the probability of poverty and the greater discontinuity of employment. Furthermore, 
that there are not only two broad conditions of employment and unemployment, but a hierarchy 
of ranks from fulltime secure employment to continuous unemployment and that in the 1970’s 
there had been a tendency for disparity to grow between these ranks. 
Townsend contends that the ideologies or models of social policy that have been followed since 
the Edwardian era, instead of eradicating poverty and disparity, have been a major vehicle 
legitimating them. This leads him to the ambiguous principle of distributional justice, which 
would include the enlargement of access to jobs through a legal “right to work”.2
 
 Townsend 
might have, in his suggestions, touched on some of the most sensitive nerves in the 
multifaceted system of labour relations. The question arise whether individual legal rights 
contribute to substantive justice as separate from procedural justice and whether individual 
rights impede or contribute to collective action to safeguard jobs and living standards?  Does the 
legislative ground of minimum employment rights strengthen, or does it reduce the relative 
dispossession of the lower ranks in the hierarchy of states of employment, sub-employment and 
unemployment? The importance of these questions lies in the fact that since the1960’s there 
has been a remarkable development of protective legislation which bestows individual legal 
rights upon employees. 
The Constitution of South Africa, (the Constitution)3
                                                 
1A revised and updated version of a Sidney Ball Lecture in the University of Oxford February 15, 1980. 
 affords everyone the right to fair labour 
practices. In light of the above it is thus necessary to observe this right in the disciplinary 
2 Peter Townsend, Poverty in the United Kingdom: a Survey of Household Resources and Standards of Living 
(1970)925. 
3108 of 1996. 
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processes at the work place and particularly when dealing with suspension as part thereof.  
Employers often are in dire straits whether to suspend or not to suspend and coupled with that, 
the question as to what has to be done before a person could be suspended. Suspension 
generally is defined as disallowing a person to enter into his or her workplace for a period of 
time, as determined by the employer. Hawkins defines suspension as “depriving a person of a 
job or position for a time,”4 whereas Grogan again, defines it as “the term used in the 
employment context to describe situations in which an employer declines to accept an 
employee’s services, but does not terminate the contract.”5
 
 
Upon entering into an employment contract, an employment relationship is established between 
the employer and the employee and this contract then enforces certain obligations that both 
parties have to observe in this employment relationship. In the event of any of the parties not 
complying with the obligations set out in the contract, there are certain remedies at their 
disposal to rectify the situation. The employer, being in an authoritative position is in the position 
to discipline an employee, whilst on the other hand; the employee is entitled to fair labour 
practices.6
 
 
1.1 AN EMOTIVE AND SERIOUS STEP 
 
Suspending an employee is an emotive and serious step that most employers do not do lightly. 
There are many reasons for suspending an employee, for example: 
 
(i) To stop any recurrence, especially where gross misconduct that could lead to dismissal 
is suspected. Suspension underlines the seriousness of the situation and the potential 
breakdown in trust. 
 
(ii) To allow proper investigation; it stops the offending employee from interfering in the 
disciplinary investigation, and it allows other employees to come forward when they can 
see the employer is considering the matter seriously. 
                                                 
4 Hawkins JM 1996.  The South African Oxford School Dictionary.  Cape Town:  Oxford University Press southern 
Africa. 450. 
5 Grogan J 2010.  Employment Rights.  page130. 
6 Conradie & Deacon2009 34(1) Journal for Juridical Science. 
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(iii) “Cooling off” may be crucial; the employee may well react better and Management more 
rationally, after taking time to calm down. This will also prevent procedural mistakes 
being made. 
 
(iv) It gets the employee focused on the fact they may well lose their job. They should now 
treat the matter seriously and they will properly review their own situation. 
 
1.2 GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
 
Since suspension from work is a very serious matter that needs to be approached with great 
caution, the following guiding principles should be followed as the norm when considering 
suspending an employee: 
 
(i) An employer need to have fair and valid reasons for suspending an employee, 
founded on fair labour relations principles. 
 
(ii) The period of suspension must be justifiable and reasonable. 
 
(iii) Suspensions are to be reviewed regularly. 
 
(iv) There need to be a distinct balance between the interests of employees continuing 
their work, and the operational and disciplinary requirements of the employer. 
 
(v) Employees must, without delay, and throughout the process, be kept informed about 
the range of steps the employer is undertaking. 
 
(vi) If suspended, an employee is entitled to a prompt and effective finalization of the 
disciplinary process. 
 
 
A major focus of this treatise is to consider to what extent the said principles are applied in 
practice. What follows then is a consideration of the effectiveness or not hereof, more 
particularly how the courts have dealt with it.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES CONCERNING SUSPENSION 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The suspension of an employee during an investigation is only recommended when the 
outcome of the hearing will be negatively affected by having the employee on the premises of 
the workplace, during the time of the investigation.  Notice of suspension should be given to 
the employee, in writing, before issuing the notice to attend the disciplinary hearing or 
simultaneous with the issuing of the notice to attend the disciplinary hearing.   An employee 
should not be suspended unnecessarily. Suspension on a minor allegation of misconduct 
might find the employer on the wrong end of the CCMA, should the employee refer a dispute 
of unfair suspension to that body. Unfair suspension falls under the heading of unfair labour 
practice and an unfair suspension may well render the disciplinary procedure to be unfair, so 
suspension should only be considered with good cause. 
 
Van Niekerk J recently commented on the suspensions of employees in a Labour Court (LC) 
judgement when he referred to a previous judgement by Molahlehi J in which the Court 
noted:7
 
 
“There is, however, a need to send a message to employers that they should refrain from hastily 
resorting to suspending employees when there are no valid reasons to do so. Suspensions have 
a detrimental impact on the affected employee and may prejudice his or her reputation, 
advancement, job security and fulfilment. It is therefore necessary that suspensions are based on 
substantive reasons and fair procedures are followed prior to suspending an employee.  In other 
words, unless circumstances dictate otherwise, the employer should offer an employee an 
opportunity to be heard before placing him or her on suspension.”  
 
 
                                                 
7 Conradie & Deacon (2009) Journal for Juridical Science 2009. 
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He further remarked on the tendency in which employers have to view suspension as a 
legitimate measure of first resort to the most unjustified suspicion of misconduct, or worse still, 
to view suspension as a useful mechanism to side-line an employee who has fallen from favour. 
   
He stated:8
 
 
“At a minimum though …requires first that the employer has a justifiable reason to believe, prima 
facie at least, that the employee has engaged in serious misconduct: secondly, that there is some 
objectively justifiable reason to deny the employee access to the workplace based on the integrity 
of any pending investigation into the alleged misconduct or some other relevant factor that would 
place the investigation or the interests of affected parties in jeopardy; and thirdly, that the 
employee is given the opportunity to state a case before the employer makes any final decision to 
suspend the employee.” 
 
It is thus clear that in van Niekerk J’s view there is a three stage approach to suspension. 
 
Suspension is only really justified in circumstances where there is reason to believe that the 
employee will or may attempt to interfere with or tamper with the evidence or witnesses, or he 
may attempt to intimidate the witnesses, or he may attempt to intimidate or victimise the 
complainant.   It may also be found necessary to suspend an employee in order to maintain the 
peace and harmony of the workplace, such as in cases of assault or sexual harassment.  
 
However, even if the employers concerns are valid it would still require the employer to follow a 
fair procedure. The employee should be afforded the opportunity to state his case. It need not 
be a formal hearing but rather a process of dialogue and reflection between the parties. It 
should be a discussion in the manager’s office during which the employee is given an 
opportunity to explain why he or she disagrees with suspension and the manager should 
naturally have a witness present at all times, which preferably should be an HR representative. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 Conradie & Deacon (2009) Journal for Juridical Science 2009. 
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2.2 OBJECTIVES OF SUSPENSIONS 
 
Before suspending employees, employers need to ensure that there is an objectively fair reason 
to suspend the employee. It is proposed that even if there is an allegation of serious 
misconduct, which may eventually lead to dismissal, on the part of the employee, the employer 
should not be too hasty in suspending the employee without considering the consequences for 
the employer if the employee is not suspended. 
 
Section 186(2)(b) of the LRA,9 disallows the unfair suspension of employees or unfair 
disciplinary action short of dismissal.  Suspensions must be disciplinary both in nature and 
intent, to comply with the terms of this provision. It seems that the term “suspension” as 
provided for in section 186(2)(b) refers only to suspension as a form of a disciplinary sanction 
and not to the situation when an employer suspends an employee pending a disciplinary 
hearing. In the event of punitive suspension without remuneration, the LC acknowledges that it 
could be a suitable consequence under certain circumstances. Employers are, as a matter of 
fact in certain circumstances, required to consider whether suspending an employee rather than 
dismissing him, not being the more appropriate sanction rather than dismissing him.10
 
 
Unfortunately the LRA does not give clear guidelines as to how the employee could be 
suspended, when and for what period an employee could be suspended. However, no matter 
what the reason for the suspending an employee is, the act of suspension does not discharge 
the employer of its contractual duty to pay the employee, even if the employee has requested a 
postponement of disciplinary action against him, until criminal proceedings have been 
concluded.11
 
 
2.3 TYPES OF SUSPENSIONS 
 
It is generally accepted that there are two types of employment-related suspensions. The first is 
called a “preventative suspension” which refers to the practice of barring an employee from 
                                                 
9(b) the unfair suspension of an employee or any other unfair disciplinary action short of dismissal in respect of an 
  employee. 
10 This is implied in section 186(2)(b). The prohibition of unfair suspension therein inevitably implies that the 
legislature accepts that in certain circumstances suspension will be fair and thus permissible.  
11Grogan J 2010. Employment Rights. page131. 
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entering the workplace to ensure that he or she does not interfere with the investigation of 
disciplinary action.  The second type of suspension is called a “punitive suspension” which 
refers to the practice of suspending an employee as a disciplinary action, which would constitute 
a sanction after the disciplinary hearing. In the first instance it implies that the employee will be 
suspended on full remuneration and in the second instance it implies that it the employee would 
be suspended without remuneration  
 
Suspension may thus be applied in the form of a “cautionary suspension” pending a disciplinary 
hearing or suspension as a disciplinary action and the distinction between the two could be 
determined by the intention of the employer applying the suspension. Should the suspension be 
intended to assist the employer in any manner during an investigation and not to punish the 
employee, it would be considered as to be a suspension as a holding operation.12
 
 
2.3.1 
 
Preventive (Precautionary) suspension 
This kind of suspension is imposed as a form of a holding or cautionary suspension, pending a 
disciplinary hearing. In practice this form of suspension usually occurs when the employer 
suspends the employee until a formal enquiry or disciplinary hearing is held.  Common law 
provides that an employer could suspend an employee without remuneration, only if the contract 
of employment provided for that from the onset, or in the event of a collective agreement or 
regulation which provided for such a penalty, or if the employee should be confronted with 
dismissal and agreed to unpaid suspension as an alternative penalty, in which case the 
employer would be obliged to prove that such variation of the contract of employment was done 
voluntarily and without force.13
 
   
A preventive suspension would clearly be unfair if it is used to punish an employee, which then 
means that the reason for suspension is not compliant with circumstances for which preventive 
suspensions are intended for. In Sajid v Mahomed NO & others,14
                                                 
12Conradie & Deacon (2009) Journal for Juridical Science. 
 the Court ruled that the 
suspension of the employee was unfair since the employer had withdrawn all charges against 
him and that there was no indication that the employer intended to arrange for an inquiry into 
whether the employee was incompatible, as originally alleged.  In the event of an employer 
withholding the employees’ remuneration during the period of suspension, pending a 
13Grogan J 2010.  Employment Rights. Page 131. 
14(2000) 21 ILJ 1204 (LC). 
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disciplinary hearing, would also constitute unfair labour practice, unless permitted to do so by 
law.  
 
2.3.1.1 
 
Suspension pending investigation 
In National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa and Nu-Fiber Form Plastics SA (Pty) Ltd,15 
Arbitrator Driscoll expressed it as follows:16
 
  
“Preventative suspension is accepted, and is not deemed to be punitive, where the employer 
bona fide believes that such action is necessary in order to properly investigate the complaints 
against the employee.  The essence of suspension pending a disciplinary hearing is that a finding 
has not been made against an employee and thus action is not intended to be a punitive 
measure, but an administrative one.” 
 
The LC has accepted that preventive suspension is included in section 186(2)(b)17 when applied 
as a forerunner to disciplinary sanction. In Koka v Director-General: Provincial Administration 
North West Government,18 a bargaining council commissioner has accepted that disputes 
concerning preventive suspension may be referred for statutory arbitration.19 In this case the LC 
quoted, with approval from the English Court of Appeal, the following:20
 
 
“Very often irregularities are disclosed in a government department or in a business house; and a 
man may be suspended on full pay, pending enquiries. Suspicion may rest on him; and so he is 
suspended until he is cleared of it. No one, so far as I know, has ever questioned such a 
suspension on the ground that it could not be done, unless he is given notice of the charge and an 
opportunity of defending himself, and so forth. The suspension in such a case is merely done by 
way of good administration. A situation has arisen in which something must be done at once. The 
work of the department or office is being affected by rumours and suspicions. The others will not 
trust the man. In order to get back to proper work, the man is suspended.”  
 
                                                 
15 2005 26 ILJ 204 (BCA) Bargaining Council Arbitration (MEGA 4999).  
16 Supra at 207.   
17 (b) the unfair suspension of an employee or any other unfair disciplinary action short of dismissal in respect of an 
employee.  
18(1997) 18 ILJ 1018 (LC). 
19Koka v Director-General: Provincial Administration, North West Government (1997) 18 ILJ 1018 (LC) at 1029A-B. 
20Lewis v Heffer & others 1978 (3) ALL ER 354 (CA) at 364C-E, also cited in Muller & others v Chairman of the 
Ministers’ Council: House of Representatives & others (1991) 12 ILJ 761 (C) at 7751-J.  
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In CEIWU on behalf of Khumalo and SHM Engineering,21
 
 Arbitrator Williams concurred and 
stated: 
“[A]lthough ‘holding’ suspensions, such as the applicant’s do not usually fall within the ambit of s 
186(2)(b), there are times that they have the same effect as a disciplinary measure…In this case, 
whilst the applicant’s suspension might well have started out as a holding measure, it went on for 
a lengthy period and accordingly had a disciplinary effect. I am therefore satisfied that it was in 
itself a disciplinary measure” 
 
 
The employer must be able to present, at least a prima facie case that the employee had 
committed some kind of misconduct and that there is a valid reason to disallow the employee at 
the workplace, for a preventive suspension to be ruled fair as the court held in NEHAWU obo 
Masilo v Department of Transport & Roads.22 In Marcus v Minister of Correctional Services & 
others,23
 
 the High Court (HC) set aside a suspension on review, due to the inability of the 
employer to prove that the employee was to blame of severe misconduct, which warranted 
suspension by the applicable regulation; and since it was clear that the employee’s presence at 
work would not have had any negative bearing on the investigation of the alleged misconduct. 
2.3.1.2 
 
Suspensions unjustifiably prolonged 
It is imperative that suspensions are not prolonged for unreasonable timeframes and that a 
speedy resolution of the dispute is found.  Hearings, when applicable, should thus be held within 
reasonable timelines and the investigation which is done prior to a hearing should also be done 
without unreasonable delay. In Mabilo v Mpumalanga Provincial Government & Others,24
 
 the 
reasons to justify a quick investigation were set out: 
(i) To prevent the unnecessary disruption in the life of the employee. 
 
(ii) To minimise the anxiety and concern of the employee. 
 
(iii) To limit the possibility that the employee will not be allowed a fair hearing. 
                                                 
21(2005) 26 ILJ 1803 (BCA).  
22[2005] 4 BALR 424 (BC). 
23(2005) 26 ILJ 745 (SE). 
24Mabilo v Mpumalanga Provincial Government & Others. 
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(iv) To resolve the dispute expeditiously.25
 
 
It is important that preventive suspension should only be imposed for a reasonable period in 
which to enable an employer to instate disciplinary action. The courts could find that the 
preventive suspension had become punitive, should this period be extended, in which case it 
would then be unfair, since the employee had not been found guilty of any misconduct as yet. In 
Minister of Labour v General Public Service Sectoral Bargaining Council & others,26 the LC held 
that when an employee is suspended, pending disciplinary action for more than two years, it 
was in breach of the applicable collective agreement which provides that a disciplinary hearing 
should be conducted within 60 days of the date of which the employer became aware of the 
misconduct and that it was thus unfair labour practice. In Van Eyk v Minister of Correctional 
Services & others,27
 
 the High Court (HC) came to a similar conclusion.   
In Lekabe v Minister of Justice & Constitutional Development,28 the Court held that a provision in 
a disciplinary code that disciplinary hearings must be commenced within 60 days against a 
suspended employee meant that the suspension became unlawful should the disciplinary 
proceedings not be commenced within that stipulated period. The Court however refused to 
hold that the dismissal of an employee was unfair for that reason if the disciplinary proceedings 
commenced after that date. In the case of Naidoo / Rudolph Chemicals (Pty) Ltd,29 the 
employee’s suspension continued for six months after the employer became aware of the 
transgressions he had allegedly committed and in CEIWU on behalf of Khumalo and SHM 
Engineering CC,30 the employee was suspended for two months before a disciplinary hearing 
commenced. The employee was suspended for three months before his disciplinary hearing 
commenced in SACCAWU obo Machipa / Dennis Pizza,31
 
 and in all these cases the Court 
found the suspensions to be unfair.  
In Nyathi & others v Special Investigating Unit,32
                                                 
25M Conradie & J Deacon, Journal for Juridical Science 2009. 
 the LC found that an employer who had 
suspended an employee for breach of her fiduciary duties, disclosure of privileged information 
26(2006) 27 ILJ 2650 (LC). 
27(2005) 26 ILJ 1039 (E).  
28(2009) 30 ILJ 2444(LC). 
29[2008] 6 BALR 497 (NBCCI). 
30(2005) 26 ILJ 1803 (BCA). 
31 [2002]2 BALR 1356 (CCMA).  
32 (2011) 32 ILJ 2991 (LC). 
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and irregular claims for allowances, for longer than the period stipulated in the employer’s 
disciplinary code, had acted unfairly and reinstated the employee. The clause in the code read:  
 
“If formal disciplinary proceedings are not instituted against a suspended member within 90 days 
from the date of his/her suspension, the suspension shall lapse and the member shall be 
reinstated to his/her post and the benefits with retrospective effect.” 
 
Basson J dismissed the employer’s argument that the time period was “merely a guide”. She 
found that the clause was framed in peremptory terms, and that its purpose was to “restrain an 
employer from abusing protracted suspension as a method of marginalizing and prejudicing an 
employee”. 
 
2.3.2 
 
Punitive suspension 
Preventive suspensions are different from punitive suspensions in so far as that in such 
suspensions the employee had not been found guilty of an alleged offence where as in punitive 
suspensions the employee indeed was found guilty of an alleged misconduct and the 
suspension is imposed as a sanction after the disciplinary hearing. This implies that the 
procedural requirements for a fair preventive suspension would also differ from those of a 
punitive suspension where the normal norms subject to all disciplinary punishments apply i.e. 
the employee must have been afforded a fair hearing and must have been proved guilty of the 
offence and the sanction must be appropriate. 
 
 
Commissioners have the prerogative to set aside suspensions which were imposed as 
disciplinary penalties in cases of them finding that the employees were innocent of the charges 
of misconduct against them for which they had been suspended.33   It may however not be 
found unfair in the event of employees deliberately delaying disciplinary hearings and where the 
employees are exclusively responsible for the delay.34
 
  
                                                                                                                                                             
 
33SA Post Office Ltd v Jansen van Vuuren NO & others (2008) 29 ILJ 2793 (LC). 
34Msipho v Plasma Cut (2005) 26 ILJ 2276 (BCA). 
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This kind of suspension can only take place as a sanction after a disciplinary hearing has been 
held. The normal rules of substantive and procedural fairness during misconduct hearing should 
be applied at all times. This type of suspension could be without benefits and is usually the kind 
of penalty to punish severe misconduct and to retain the skills of the employee. As stated, 
legislation does not give detailed guidance on this and one is reliant on case law to give 
guidance on when suspensions would be appropriate in this process.    
 
Suspension as a punitive measure must be substantially and procedurally fair and the reason 
for the suspension must be serious enough to justify a dismissal and must follow a disciplinary 
hearing.  It is usually utilised by an employer as a form of disciplinary measure short of 
dismissal, though the employer is not compelled to take this route when deciding on a suitable 
sanction.  In Miya v Smiths Manufacturing (Pty) Ltd,35 the Industrial Court held:36
 
 
“[A]n employee does not have a right to expect his employer, unless this is enshrined in some 
agreement or code, to extend to him an offer to accept suspension without pay as a disciplinary 
measure.  In the absence of an agreement to this effect the extension of such an offer is a matter 
of grace which lies within the discretion of the employer and he will not generally be faulted 
should he fail to make such an offer.” 
 
2.4  PROTECTION OF WORKERS AGAINST UNFAIR SUSPENSIONS 
 
2.4.1 
 
The “terms and conditions” of suspension 
Before an employer could even contemplate to suspend an employer, the employee must be 
provided with a notice of the intended suspension. In the notice the employer must provide 
detailed information regarding the intended suspension, such as the reason for the suspension 
and adequate details regarding the reason of which must be of such that the employee could 
respond meaningfully to the allegations against him. The conditions of the suspension and a 
reasonable indication of the timeframe of the suspension have to be included.   
 
If the intended suspension is a preventive one, the employee must be clearly informed as to 
why his presence at work cannot be allowed and the exact reason for this must be provided.  If 
the intended suspension is a punitive one it implies that the misconduct was of such nature that 
                                                 
35Miya v Smiths Manufacturing (Pty) Ltd 1995 1 ICJ 1.12.39. 
36M Conradie & J Deacon, Journal for Juridical Science 2009. 
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it would warrant a dismissal, but due to mitigating factors37
 
 it was rather decided to suspend 
him. In this instance it could be assumed that a disciplinary hearing or investigation had already 
taken place before the suspension was imposed. The employer would have then already 
decided on a suspension rather that a dismissal and would have informed the employee at that 
stage about the suspension, the timeframe thereof, as well as the reasons for the decision. 
In the case of a precautionary suspension, the reason for suspension of an employee has to be 
indicated on the notice of suspension.  An employer is compelled to avail the detailed reasons 
for suspension and failure to do so could constitute procedural unfairness. The employer has to 
prove that the preventive suspension of an employee is based on factual grounds in which he 
has to prove that the employee’s presence could be detrimental to the investigation and the fact 
that an investigation will be conducted is insufficient reason for a suspension. When it is found 
that the preventive suspension is instated to actually punish the employee, it will automatically 
be rendered as substantially unfair. The possible impact of the suspension with regards to the 
humiliation attached to it is insufficient grounds for an employee to oppose a suspension.38
 
 
Suspension as a disciplinary sanction will only be allowed in instances which would have 
warranted dismissal and usually on grounds of gross misconduct. In instances where it is 
permitted by law or contract to suspend an employee without remuneration, it would rather be 
recommended as an alternative sanction to dismissal after all circumstance have been 
considered to justify it as a sufficient reason. Employers should always observe the Code of 
Good Practice:  Dismissal39 in ensuring a fair reason for suspension as stated by Landman J in 
Country Fair v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and others:40
“The Code of Good Practice which is set out in schedule 8 to the LRA is, I presume, a code issued in 
terms of the Act. Therefore it is a Code of Good Practice which must be taken into account by any 
person considering whether or not the reason for dismissal is a fair reason in terms of s 188(2) of the 
LRA. The effect of this is that the employer must take the code into account in the first instance.” 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37The employee’s years of service, previous disciplinary record, age and circumstances. 
38M Conradie & J Deacon, Journal for Juridical Science 2009. 
39Schedule 8 of the LRA. 
40(1998) 19 ILJ 815 (LC). 
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2.4.2 
 
Non-compliance with prescribed provisions or internal policies 
When suspensions are considered it is important that the internal suspension policies, which 
would normally include the provisions of for instance the consideration of alternatives before 
taking the route of suspension, of the workplace are observed.  Whether employers may deviate 
from the policies/codes would be determined by the individual circumstances of each case.  
Conditions may differ from case to case, thus a deviation from the policy/code would either be 
allowed or disallowed depending on what would be the fairest option for the employee. In Ned v 
Department of Social Services & Population Development,41 the disciplinary code provided for 
precautionary suspension with a hearing to be held within a month from the date of suspension. 
The hearing did however not take place as prescribed and Arbitrator Hutchinson, satisfied that 
the disciplinary code followed a collective agreement declared that the employer acted 
unfairly.42
 
 
In Lebu Van Niekerk J summarised the procedural steps to ensure a fair suspension, to be as 
follows: 
 
(i)  The employer must have prima facie evidence of serious misconduct. 
 
(ii) The employer must reasonably believe that the continued presence of the employee 
would jeopardize an investigation, or that the employee might commit further acts of 
misconduct, or may interfere with potential witnesses. 
 
(iii) The employer must inform the employee of the above suspicions in sufficient detail to 
enable the employee to respond 
 
(iv) The employee must be permitted time to prepare a response to the suspicions. 
 
(v) The employee should be given an opportunity to make representations to the employer. 
 
(vi) The employer must seriously consider the representations and make a decision on 
whether or not to suspend. 
 
                                                 
41Ned v Department of Social Services & Population Development. 
42M Conradie & J Deacon, Journal for Juridical Science 2009. 
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In POPCRU obo Sephanda & another v Provincial Commissioner, SA Police Service, Gauteng 
Province & another,43 the LC reviewed and set aside the suspension (without pay) of two 
policemen suspected of bribery and defeating the ends of justice. Lagrange J found that the 
provincial commissioner had contravened the SA Police Service Discipline Regulations 2006.44
 
 
The suspensions were instituted following an investigation into alleged misconduct, and during 
the disciplinary enquiry (there was no precautionary purpose to the suspensions). To the extent 
that the real purpose was to prevent the accused employees from intimidating witnesses, the 
details hereof were never put to the employees to respond to prior to the decision to suspend. 
In Marcus v Minister of Correctional Services & others,45
 
 Jansen J confirmed an interim order, 
setting aside the suspension of an area commissioner and reinstating him into his previous 
position. The Court found that the Department of Correctional Services did not comply with its 
own suspension policy. Not only had the employer contravened the audi rule, as the employer 
did not provided reasons for the suspension, enabling the employee to respond, but it had also 
not shown that the employee's presence at the workplace would put at risk the investigation into 
the alleged misconduct. Moreover, the employer did not consider alternatives, such as a 
transfer) to the suspension. All three aspects (the audi rule, the risk of the employee at work, 
and the transfer alternative) were clearly set out in the employer's policy. Since the employer 
had breached the relevant provisions, the Court found that the employer had not applied its 
mind to the matter and the rule nisi was confirmed. 
2.4.3 
 
Invalid decision to suspend  
In Taung Local Municipality v Mofokeng,46
 
 the LC found that the municipality had irregularly 
suspended its municipal manager after allegations of irregular spending and procurement 
transgressions had been brought to its attention by the South African Municipal Workers Union. 
The Court ruled that as the decision to suspend was taken at a council meeting which did not 
have a quorum, the decision was invalid. Molahlehi J held as follows: 
                                                 
43 (2012) 33 ILJ 2110 (LC). 
44 Gazette 28985 of 3 July 2006. 
45 (2005) 26 ILJ 745 (SE). 
46 (2011) 32 ILJ 2259 (LC). 
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“[T]he fact that the defect is limited to procedure is immaterial in the assessment of its validity and 
force in law because it offends one of the basic principles of our law, namely the rule of law. The 
rule of law is foundational to any relationship between the parties in a constitutional democracy. 
The parties to any relationship are required to act lawfully in their interaction with each other. ... 
The manner in which the resolution in this matter was taken does not only undermine the rule of 
law but also fundamentally undermines the constitutional right to fair labour practices of the 
respondent. Thus the fact that the defect is limited to a procedural defect does not detract from 
the fundamental requirement of compliance with the rule of law.” 
 
2.5 RESTRICTIONS ON THE RIGHT TO SUSPEND 
 
Though the LRA does not provide for clear guidance on how suspensions should take place, 
there are some basic principles that need to be taken into account before suspending an 
employee as set by the courts. Precautionary Suspensions are part of the disciplinary procedure 
and is not a punishment on its own right and does not imply guilt or that disciplinary action will 
necessarily follow. Suspending an employee, even with full remuneration and benefits, is a 
sensitive and serious step which should not be done lightly. Providing there is a valid reason for 
the suspension and the employee is not disadvantaged and continues to receive his 
remuneration and benefits, an employer would have the right to suspend. 
 
The following questions provided good guidelines when considering whether or not to suspend 
an employee: 
 
(i) Is there prima facie reason to believe that the employee was engaged in the 
misconduct?  
(ii) Is the alleged misconduct of a severe nature?  
 
(iii) Is there a likelihood that the employee may tamper with witnesses? 
 
(iv) Is there a chance that the employee may interfere with evidence?  
 
(v) Is there a risk that the accused employee may strike back at the complainant, particularly 
if the complainant is in a lower rank that the accused employee?  
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(vi) Is there a prospect that the employee may perpetrate further similar acts of misconduct if 
not suspended? 
 
2.6 CONCLUSION      
 
A precautionary suspension for a long duration may be found to be unfair if challenged by an 
employee. Furthermore, employers should be consistent in the application of suspension of 
employees, not only comparable cases should be treated the same, but even in the event of 
more than one employee is alleged to have been part of the same transgression which warrants 
suspension, each of them should be subjected to possible suspension. 
 
Suspension is undeniably a crucial instrument when it comes to preservation of workplace 
discipline and employers should be urged to use suspension to give effect to fair procedures in 
dismissal cases but also to give effect to progressive discipline in the workplace.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
NATIONAL LEGISLATION RELATING TO SUSPENSION 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
A suspension that is not substantively and procedurally fair can be constitutionally challenged 
as an unfair labour practice. Further to the discussions in the previous chapter, it is necessary 
to elaborate for the sake of giving authority to a constitutionally entrenched right that in 
considering the requirement for a fair suspension, it is necessary to distinguish between 
preventative and punitive suspensions.47 A preventative suspension has been said to be a 
‘practice, universally followed by employers, [to suspend] employees until serious charges 
against them are properly investigated and, if they are found to have substance, permitting 
the employee to answer them’ as in Ortlieb/Khulani Springbok Patrols.48
 
 The CCMA also 
noted that this practice is not in itself unfair. In order for a preventative suspension to be fair, it 
would appear that there has to be both substantive and procedural fairness. 
3.2 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA NO 108 OF 
1996 
 
Section 23(1) of the Constitution states as follow: 
 
 “(1) Everyone has the right to fair labour practices.” 
 
Considerations of substantive fairness in the constitutional context relate to the reason for the 
suspension – the employer must have a justifiable reason for believing that the employee is 
involved in serious misconduct and that suspension is necessary. This could be where the 
seriousness of the misconduct may create a state of affairs (such as rumours and suspicion) 
necessitating a suspension of the employee in order for work to carry on smoothly, or where 
the employer has a reason to fear that the employee in question may interfere with the 
                                                 
47 Basson et al Essential Labour Law 5th ed (2009) 206 – 208. 
48 [1999] 4 BALR 423 (CCMA).  
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investigation or the witnesses. It may also be that the employer fears another recurrence of 
the misconduct or where the seniority and authority of the employee in question has a bearing 
on the matter.  
 
Procedural fairness is also important. As far as granting an employee a hearing before a 
suspension is concerned, it seems accepted that this is necessary in those circumstances 
where an employer is allowed to suspend an employee without pay as was the case in the 
matter of PSA obo Matemane / Department of Education, Arts, Culture and Sport.49
 
 Where 
the suspension is on full pay (and, typically, with retention of benefits) this is not necessarily 
the case, but it remains advisable and good practice, to allow the employee to submit reasons 
to try and influence the decision to suspend. In this regard, the remarks of the LC in Mogothle 
as discussed above, although made in the context of the common law duty to fair dealings on 
employers, are important and worth quoting at some length-         
“[36] The right to be heard prior to suspension has been the subject of two recent decisions by this court. In 
HOSPERSA & another v MEC for Health, Gauteng Provincial Government [2008] 9 BLLR 861 (LC), Basson 
J granted relief, on an urgent basis, to an employee who had been transferred for reasons relating to alleged 
misconduct. The judgment draws an analogy in this context with the suspension of an employee pending a 
disciplinary enquiry, and expressly holds that an employee is entitled to be heard before the employer acts 
against the employee. In SAPO Ltd v Jansen van Vuuren NO and others [2008] 8 BLLR798 (LC), Molahlehi 
J stated: 
“There is, however, a need to send a message to employers that they should refrain from hastily 
resorting to suspending employees when there are no valid reasons to do so. Suspensions have a 
detrimental impact on the affected employee and may prejudice his or her reputation, 
advancement, job security and fulfilment. It is therefore necessary that suspensions are based on 
substantive reasons and fair procedures are followed prior to suspending an employee. In other 
words, unless circumstances dictate otherwise, the employer should offer an employee an 
opportunity to be heard before placing him or her on suspension” (at para 37).  
 
[37] I do not think that what the court intended by this statement was that a hearing prior to a suspension 
should be modelled on what has been termed the “criminal justice model” with al of the hallmarks of a 
criminal trial. This court has held previously that the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal in Schedule 8 to the 
LRA envisages a less formal process … a process of dialogue and reflection between the parties [the 
reference is to Avril Elizabeth home for the Mentally Handicapped v CCMA & others (2006) 27 ILJ 1644 at  
                                                 
49 [2000] 5 BALR 555 (CCMA). 
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1653]. I see no reason why the same conception of procedural fairness should not apply prior to a proposed 
suspension pending an investigation into alleged misconduct. 
 
[38] This statement by Molahlehi J is also a response, I believe, to the trend apparent in this court in which 
employers tend to regard suspension as a legitimate measure of first resort to the most groundless 
suspicion of misconduct, or worse still, to view suspension as a convenient mechanism to marginalize an 
employee who has fallen from favour.    
[39] In summary: each case of preventative suspension must be considered on its own merits. At a minimum 
though, the application of the contractual principle of fair dealing between employer and employee, imposing 
as it does a continuing [duty] of fairness on employers when they make decisions affecting their employees, 
requires first that the employer has a justifiable reason to believe, prima facie at least, that the employee has 
engaged in serious misconduct; secondly, that there is some objectively justifiable reason to deny the 
employee access to the workplace based on the integrity of any pending investigation into the alleged 
misconduct or some other relevant factor that would place the investigation into the alleged misconduct or 
some other relevant factor that would place the investigation or the interest of affected parties in jeopardy; 
and thirdly, that the employee is given the opportunity to state a case before the employer makes any final 
decision to suspend the employee.” 
 
The employee should also be entitled to be informed (preferably in writing) of the suspension, 
the reasons for the suspension and the conditions of the suspension. The employee should 
be informed of matters such as payment, whether the employee is relieved of any or all of his 
or her duties and whether the employee is prohibited from entering the premises of the 
employer. The employee should also be informed as to when the suspension will be lifted. As 
a general rule, the employer must continue remunerating the employee during the course of 
the suspension. This is dictated by the of contract – if the employer were to stop remunerating 
the employee, it would be in breach of the employment contract as in the matter of Sappi 
Forest (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & Others,50 below.  A suspension without pay is only generally 
possible if the employee consents or if this is provided for by legislation or the contract of 
employment itself. There is some authority, however, for the principle that an employee 
whose suspension starts out on full pay, may lose the right to be paid before finalisation of the 
disciplinary process. In both SAEWA obo members/ Aberdare Cables51
                                                 
50[2009] 3 BLLR 254 (LC). 
 where the employee 
sought and was granted a postponement of the disciplinary enquiry, and the Ortlieb case 
above, where the employee refused to participate in disciplinary proceedings, it was held that 
the employee lost the right to continued payment.  
51 [2007] 2 BALR 106 (MEIBC). 
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[38] This statement by Molahlehi J is also a response, I believe, to the trend apparent in this court in which 
employers tend to regard suspension as a legitimate measure of first resort to the most groundless 
suspicion of misconduct, or worse still, to view suspension as a convenient mechanism to marginalize an 
employee who has fallen from favour.    
[39] In summary: each case of preventative suspension must be considered on its own merits. At a minimum 
though, the application of the contractual principle of fair dealing between employer and employee, imposing 
as it does a continuing [duty] of fairness on employers when they make decisions affecting their employees, 
requires first that the employer has a justifiable reason to believe, prima facie at least, that the employee has 
engaged in serious misconduct; secondly, that there is some objectively justifiable reason to deny the 
employee access to the workplace based on the integrity of any pending investigation into the alleged 
misconduct or some other relevant factor that would place the investigation into the alleged misconduct or 
some other relevant factor that would place the investigation or the interest of affected parties in jeopardy; 
and thirdly, that the employee is given the opportunity to state a case before the employer makes any final 
decision to suspend the employee.” 
 
The employee should also be entitled to be informed (preferably in writing) of the suspension, 
the reasons for the suspension and the conditions of the suspension. The employee should 
be informed of matters such as payment, whether the employee is relieved of any or all of his 
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whose suspension starts out on full pay, may lose the right to be paid before finalisation of the 
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52[2009] 3 BLLR 254 (LC). 
 where the employee 
sought and was granted a postponement of the disciplinary enquiry, and the Ortlieb case 
above, where the employee refused to participate in disciplinary proceedings, it was held that 
the employee lost the right to continued payment. There are a number of important 
53 [2007] 2 BALR 106 (MEIBC). 
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differences when it comes to punitive suspension. While a preventative suspension normally 
is on full pay, a paid suspension used as a disciplinary penalty (instead of a dismissal) would 
hardly seem appropriate – employers normally want to apply the punitive suspension without 
pay. Suspension without pay furthermore is typically only used as a penalty where the 
contract, disciplinary code or legislation allows for this. However, in some cases relating to 
unfair dismissal disputes, the CCMA has ordered reinstatement without retrospective effect: 
in other words, the employee is reinstated, but not paid for the period between the dismissal 
and the CCMA proceedings. Perhaps one can argue that this is actually suspension without 
pay and, by analogy of reasoning, that employers should, as a general rule, be able to 
suspend without pay as an alternative to dismissal if a warning is too lenient but dismissal is 
seen as too harsh. It may also be possible to get the employee to agree to a suspension 
without pay as an alternative to dismissal (but certainly here the employee is under duress) or 
to dismiss the employee (in a substantively and procedurally fair manner) and then offer to re-
engage the employee at a later time.   
 
It is clear from the above that employers should be cautious in considering the suspension of 
an employee as it can end up in an abyss of legal processes, as was the case in Grootboom 
v National Prosecuting Authority and Another54
 
 that surely caused embarrassment to the 
National Prosecuting Authority (NPA). This matter will be discussed in length, as it should 
bring home the notion that employers are too quick to invoke suspension. 
Derrick Grootboom (the applicant) commenced his employment with the NPA in April 2001, 
as a prosecutor and was transferred on a number of occasions to various other work places 
of the respondents. He was initially employed in 2001, in Springbok was transferred to Port 
Elizabeth in June 2003. After spending some three years in Port Elizabeth the applicant was 
transferred to the Upington but stationed at Springbok as of February 2006. The duty of the 
applicant whilst based at Springbok was to travel to various magisterial districts in and around 
Upington and because of this he was entitled to subsistence and traveling allowances. 
Because of the dissatisfaction with the payment of his traveling allowances the applicant 
lodged a grievance with the first respondent. According to the applicant, instead of 
responding to the grievance the first respondent suspended him on the 22nd June 2005, 
                                                 
54 [2013] CCT 08/13 (CC). 
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pending a disciplinary hearing which was to take place then on the 21st September 2005. 
Further to the disciplinary hearing the applicant was found guilty of misconduct and dismissed 
on the 28th March 2006. 
 
With the effluxion of time the matter morphed into an arduous legal battle. The applicant 
being unhappy with the outcome of the disciplinary hearing referred his alleged unfair 
dismissal dispute to the Public Service Coordinating Bargaining Council (PSCBC) for 
conciliation and arbitration. The arbitration hearing was set down for the 1st and 2nd June 
2006.  The outcome of the disciplinary hearing was set aside on the 1st June 2006, by the 
arbitrator of the PSCBC and the parties agreed that the applicant’s disciplinary hearing would 
proceed on the basis of a pre-dismissal arbitration.  
 
The pre-dismissal arbitration was set down by the PSCBC for the 14th to the 17th August 
2006. The matter was then according to the applicant postponed sine die.  Subsequent to the 
postponement the applicant approached one of the officials of the first respondent to sign the 
requisite study leave forms to go and study in the United Kingdom. According to him he had 
already made arrangements for his further studies in the UK whilst he was on suspension. 
The applicant left the country soon after the postponement of the pre-dismissal arbitration 
proceedings to attend his LLM studies in the UK.  It was common cause that the salary of the 
applicant was frozen at the end of October 2006. Following the freezing of the salary there 
was an exchange of emails between the applicant and the officials of the first respondent 
responsible for the labour relations between the period November and December 2006 
concerning this issue. 
 
Instead of reinstating the salary, the applicant received a letter on 1st February 2007 from the 
NPA informing him that he had not been granted leave of absence to further his studies 
outside the Republic of South Africa and that no application for leave had been received or 
approved by the first respondent. It was for this reason that it would appear that the 
provisions of section 17(5)(a)(i) of the Public Service Act55
                                                 
55 103 of 1994.   Section 17(5) of the Act  has since been substituted by section 25 of the Public Service Amendment 
 was evoked by the first respondent. 
The employment of the applicant was accordingly deemed to have been terminated on the 
   Act 30 of 2007, and is now subsection 17(3)(a) and (b) of the Public Service Act. There are no material differences 
   between the two sections. 
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15th September 2006. The applicant was however advised in the same e-mail, that in terms of 
section 17(5)(b) of the PSA, he had the right to make representations to the Minister of 
Justice and Constitutional Development (Minister) for his reinstatement. The Applicant 
remained in the UK and continued his studies. He only returned to South Africa on 30 July 
2013. Upon his return, the applicant, acting in terms of section 17(5)(b), submitted written 
representations to the Minister on 5 September 2007, in an attempt to show good cause for 
having gone away for 12 months on the study programme and to secure his reinstatement. 
The NPA replied by a letter dated 22 February 2008 advising him that the Minister “has 
applied her mind to [his] representations and has upheld [his] deemed discharge by operation 
of law.” The letter concludes that he “may seek a remedy to the decision from the High 
Court”.  
 
The applicant then brought his application to review the decision of the first respondent to the 
LC and sought confirmation thereof by the second respondent in terms of the grounds set out 
in section 6(2) of the Promotion of Administration Act (PAJA).56
 
 The grounds for review were 
that the first respondent was biased or took the decision for ulterior motive and also took into 
account irrelevant considerations. In the alternative the applicant challenged the decision of 
the second respondent to uphold the decision of the first respondent based on the common 
law grounds as codified in section 6(2) of PAJA. The grounds are also based on bias, ulterior 
motive, failure to take into account relevant considerations, bad faith and arbitrariness or 
capriciously. The LC however found on the 18th December 2009 that the applicant failed to 
make out a case justifying interference with the decision of the respondents. Secondly, it 
found that by going to the UK on a 12-month scholarship without the NPA’s permission, the 
applicant had absented himself as envisaged by section 17(5)(a)(i) and reasoned as follows: 
“In this respect the applicant contended that the [NPA] was aware that he would be leaving on a scholarship 
to study outside the country. I have earlier in this judgment indicated that a suspended employee has a duty 
to inform his or her employer about his or her whereabouts during the period of suspension and may have 
seek permission if he or she is to be away in circumstances that he or she would not be able to resume duty 
if he or she was so directed by the employer. The fact that the employer had knowledge about his 
whereabouts is irrelevant as what is key is whether or not the absence was authorized. The facts of this 
case indicate very clearly that the applicant never received authority to be away for an excessive period of 
                                                 
56 Act No 3 of 2000. 
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one year. The criteria for [invoking] the provisions of section 17(5)(a) of the [Act] [were] in my view satisfied 
and thus the [NPA] was entitled to [invoke] the provisions of that subsection.” 
 
Aggrieved by the LC’s dismissal of his application, the applicant appealed to the Labour 
Appeal Court (LAC). Adopting similar reasoning, the LAC broadly endorsed the findings of the 
LC and dismissed the appeal with costs. In main the LAC agreed with the LC that the 
applicant’s services were terminated by operation of law and that the respondents had not 
taken any decision or action which could be reviewed and set aside. For this finding the LC 
relied on the matters of Minister van Onderwys en Kultuur an Andere v Louw57 and Phenithi v 
Minister of Education and Others.58
 
 Regarding the basis for his deemed discharge, it agreed 
that the LC was correct in finding that’ by this conduct, the applicant had brought himself 
within the net of section 17(5)(a)(i). It concluded that he was discharged by mere operation of 
law.  
Subsequently the applicant referred the matter to the Constitutional Court (CC). As the matter 
revolved around the correct interpretation of section 17(5)(a)(i) of the PSA, the CC 
subsequently had to consider section 39(2) of the Constitution that requires legislation to be 
interpreted to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. The CC held in the 
pass that a constitutional is raised where the interpretation of legislation may impact on a 
fundamental right of a litigant under the Bill of Rights. In this matter, section 17(5)(a)(i) 
effectively countenances the dismissal of a state employee without a hearing and implicates 
the right to fair labour practices enshrined in section 23 of the Constitution. The 
constitutionality of the section was not attacked; hence it had to be interpreted in a manner 
best compatible with the Constitution. The CC thus agreed with the applicant that a 
Constitutional issue was thus at stake in this matter. The CC stated that section 17(5) has the 
potential to affect people employed in the public service and that its reach is thus extensive. 
Further to this it has the adverse effect of terminating employment for misconduct without 
notice or hearing, and it is therefore important for the CC to determine the proper scope of its 
application. The CC added that the appeal had prospects of success and that it would thus be 
in the interest of justice to grant leave to appeal. 
                                                 
57 [1995 (4) SA 383 (A). 
58 [2008 (1) SA 420 (SCA). 
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In considering this matter, the CC thus had to dissect the factors and the implications that 
section 23 of the Constitution could have on the outcome of this application. Although the 
applicant was dismissed from the services of the NPA, it was his suspension that opened the 
door to this arduous legal battle. It is for this reason that I find it appropriate to reflect the 
considerations of the CC that reads as follows: 
 
     “Have the jurisdictional requirements of section 17(5) been met? 
 
 [39] Section 17(5) provides: 
“(a) (i) An officer, other than a member of the services or an educator or a member of the National 
Intelligence Services, who absents himself or herself from his or her official duties without 
permission of his or her head of department, office or institution for a period exceeding one 
calendar month, shall be deemed to have been discharged from the public service on account of 
misconduct with effect from the date immediately succeeding his or her last day of attendance at 
his or her place of duty. 
(ii) If such an officer assumes other employment, he or she shall be deemed to have been 
discharged as aforesaid irrespective of whether the said period has expired or not. 
 
(b) If an officer who is deemed to have been so discharged, reports for duty at any time after the 
expiry of the period referred to in paragraph (a), the Commission may, notwithstanding anything to 
the contrary contained in any law, recommend that, subject to the approval of the relevant 
executing authority, he or she be reinstated in the public service in his or her former or any other 
post or position on such conditions as the Commission may recommend, and in such a case the 
period of his or her absence from official duty shall be deemed to be absence on vacation leave 
without pay or leave on such other conditions as the Commission may recommend.” 
 
[40] The applicant’s primary ground of appeal was an attack on the application of section 17(5)(a)(i). 
Given my findings in this regard, it is unnecessary to say anything more about his other grounds of 
appeal. The applicant submits that the respondents have failed to prove that, by going to the UK on 
a study programme, he absented himself from his official duties as contemplated by the section. 
The premise of this argument is that it is fallacious for the respondents to suggest that the applicant 
had absented himself from his employment. This is so because he had already been placed on 
suspension and prohibited from performing any official duties with clear instructions not to come to 
his place of employment or have any contact with the NPA’s staff. It was therefore impossible for 
him to absent himself from his place of employment within the meaning of section 17(5)(a)(i) from 
when his employer expressly required his absence from the workplace. 
 
[41] The following facts appear to be common cause. The applicant was employed by the NPA as a 
public prosecutor. In 2005, he was placed on precautionary suspension with pay. As part of the 
conditions of his suspension he was prevented from coming to his place of employment, 
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communicating with his colleagues or performing any functions or duties for the NPA during his 
suspension. Whilst still on suspension and without permission, he left for the UK on a scholarship. 
The question is whether his conduct amounts to absenting himself from his official duties without 
permission. 
 
[42] It is so that the applicant was absent from his employment. He was absent because he was 
suspended. This means that he was absent with the permission of his employer. Therefore, one of 
the essential requirements of section 17(5)(a)(i) has not been met.  
 
[43] Does his departure to the UK detract from the fact that he was still on suspension? Whilst grappling 
with the meaning of the word “suspension” in Gladstone the Court stated: 
 
“When an employee is ‘suspended’ it appears to me that apart from any express instructions he 
must hold himself available to perform his duties if called upon; though for the time being he is 
debarred from doing his work. . . . First of all, if suspension is to be interpreted in the manner which 
I have indicated, it is an open question whether the man who is suspended may or may not be 
called upon to render further services”. 
 
  
[44] The Appellate Division grappled with the same legal question in Masinga, which concerned a 
suspended employee of the KwaZulu Department of Justice. That case, applied a different albeit 
similarly worded section, namely section 19(29) of the KwaZulu Public Service Act. However, on 
the facts Masinga is distinguishable.  
 
  
 [45] Although one might be tempted to conclude that by virtue of having undertaken a scholarship to the 
UK, the applicant would, in all likelihood, have found it impractical to return to resume his 
employment if he were recalled, I find such a conclusion to be unfounded and speculative in the 
absence of any evidence that he was called to take up his duties and failed to do so. Moreover, the 
NPA knew where the applicant was at all relevant times as it was communicating with him via 
email. It made a conscious decision not to recall but to discharge him. This fact leads me 
inexorably to conclude that the finding by both the Labour Court and the Labour Appeal Court in 
this regard is wrong. 
  
[46] In conclusion, the appeal must succeed.  
 
Order 
 [48] The following order is made: 
1. The respondents’ applications for condonation are dismissed. 
2.   Leave to appeal is granted. 
3.  The appeal is upheld. 
4.  The orders of the Labour Court and Labour Appeal Court are set aside. 
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5. It is declared that the applicant did not absent himself from his official duties without 
permission as contemplated in section 17(5)(a)(i) of the Public Service Act 103 of 1994 
and that he continues to be in the first respondent’s employ. 
6. The respondents are ordered to pay the applicant’s costs in the Labour Court as well as 
his necessary disbursements in the Labour Appeal Court, Supreme Court of Appeal and 
Constitutional Court, jointly and severally.” 
 
This CC ruling is important in various aspects, but in particular that it gives authority to section 
23 of the Constitution. The CC was clear that Grootboom was absent from work because he 
was suspended, meaning that he was absent with the permission of the employer. Venturing 
into suspending an employee without good cause, could lead the employer into a minefield. 
Suspension should surely not be used to get back at an employee, as consequences could be 
very damaging as clearly shown in this case. The ego or perhaps arrogance of the employer 
has no place in the workplace and this CC matter will go a long way in eradicating such 
practices.  This ruling was overdue and should be welcomed by employees who are intimidated 
by their employers who use suspension as a stick.      
 
3.3 LABOUR RELATIONS ACT NO 66 OF 1995 
 
Section 186(2) of the LRA states as follow: 
  
 “(2) “Unfair labour practice” means any unfair act or omission that arises between an  
  employer and an employee involving – 
 
unfair conduct by the employer relating to the promotion, demotion, probation (excluding disputes 
about dismissals for a reason relating to probation) or training of an employee or relating 
to the provision of benefits to an employee; 
(b) unfair suspension of an employee or any other unfair disciplinary action short of dismissal 
in respect of an employee; 
(c) a failure or refusal by an employer to reinstate or re-employ a former employee in terms of 
any agreement; and 
(d) an occupational detriment, other than dismissal, in contravention of the Protected 
Disclosures Act, 2000 (Act No. 26 of 2000), on account of the employee having made a 
protected disclosure defined in that Act.” 
Per implication of section 186(2)(b) above, it is clear that not all suspensions of employees can 
be regarded as unfair and would therefore not always constitute an unfair labour practice.  In  
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Nohe & another / Maswika Stones t/a Tombstones Land,59
“the “unfair suspension” embodied in section 186(2)(b) of the Act precedes the words “or any other 
disciplinary action short of dismissal in respect of an employee”. The word “other” in the said section can 
only mean that the Legislature regards “unfair suspension” as but one type of “unfair disciplinary action short 
of dismissal”. Had the Legislature intended that any suspension could (if unfair) amount to an unfair labour 
practice, it would surely have dealt with suspension on its own in a sub-paragraph of section 186(2). The 
Legislature, in other words, would not have linked the words “unfair suspension” to “unfair disciplinary action 
short of dismissal” by using the words “any other”, if it did not regard the “unfair suspension” referred to in 
section 186(2)(b) of the Act as but one type of “unfair disciplinary action short of dismissal”. What this means 
is that a suspension which is not “disciplinary action short of dismissal” cannot amount to an unfair labour 
practice in terms of section 186(2)(b) of the Act. The “disciplinary action” which is envisaged by section 
186(2)(b) of the Act, is a form of punishment, or a penalty (such as a written warning, suspension from work 
for a period of time, demotion, etc.) which is imposed on an employee by an employer for some sort of 
misconduct.  
  commissioner Boyce took a fresh 
approach to the interpretation of a suspension in terms of section 186 (2)(b). The applicants 
claimed that they have been unfairly suspended after the employer discovered cash shortages. 
The suspension of the two employees was on full pay and pending a disciplinary hearing but 
they persisted that their suspensions constitute an unfair labour practice. Commissioner Boyce 
interpreted section 186 (2)(b) of the Labour Relations Act as follows:  
In the present matter suspensions were not punitive suspensions, and they, consequently, did not amount to 
"disciplinary action". The applicants’ suspensions were procedural steps pending their disciplinary 
hearings... The said suspensions were, therefore, not suspensions as contemplated by section 186(2)(b) of 
the Act since they cannot possibly fall into the category of “unfair disciplinary action short of dismissal”.”  
It is my submission that the commissioner read too much in the words “any other” as he 
would find it difficult to convince the LC that a suspension which is not disciplinary action 
short of dismissal cannot amount to an unfair labour practice. This would mean that only 
unfair conditions in a punitive suspension could be interpreted as an unfair labour practice.  
Surely the aim of suspension is that the employer believes that the employee has engaged in 
serious misconduct and that there are justifiable reasons to deny the employee access to the 
workplace in order to prevent him/her from interfering in the investigation. It is precisely the 
contractual principles of fair dealings that apply in suspension and surely not limited to 
punitive suspensions, as this action from the employer would precisely take place prior to the 
disciplinary hearing.   
                                                 
59[2011] 1BALR 93 (CCMA). 
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Section 193(4) of the LRA provides that a dispute about an unfair suspension may be 
determined on terms deemed reasonable by the Commissioner, and specifically includes 
reinstatement. What an appropriate remedy would be will depend on the reasons why the 
suspension is unfair. There may be cases where an employee would be justified in seeking 
reinstatement – for example where the suspension has been for an unduly long period and 
there are no real prospects of a disciplinary hearing taking place or where the suspension is 
substantively or procedurally grossly unfair. If the procedural unfairness is less serious, a 
suspension may well be upheld, but the conditions of the business may be altered or, for 
example, the employer may be directed to hold a disciplinary hearing within a specified time 
(and if the employer fails to do this, that the employee should be reinstated). 
 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
 
Labour legislation in South Africa provides both the employer and the employee with an 
environment in which they can manage their relationship in a structured and organized 
fashion. What is clear from the above is that legislation, however progressive and sound, 
cannot provide for the elimination of exploitation of the provision that an employer, could 
under certain circumstances, suspend an employee. Suspension, in both the private and 
public sector is abused and used as a tool discredit employees. 
 
In the matter of Grootboom, the suspension was preceded by a grievance that was filed by 
the employee against the NPA. What makes this practice especially controversial is that 
employees will lose their liberty to make unbiased recommendations and decisions. This 
factor would be relevant in circumstances where an official is appointed as a presiding officer 
in a disciplinary hearing and must make a decision on the guilt or innocence of the accused 
employee. In cases where the decision goes against the Department or the employer, the 
presiding officer could become the target and there seems to be an entrenched practice, 
especially in the public sector, to threaten such an officer with suspension. The potential then 
exist for the employer to dig for any contravention, in order to make up charges against such 
official.  This practice would have the effect that presiding officers, who in the past was bold 
enough to make unbiased decision against the employer, are not prepared to chair a 
disciplinary enquiry. 
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When an employee, especially in the public service is suspended, the perception of the public 
is normally that such an employee must be guilty, as corruption in the public service is 
rampant.  Surely this practice engaged in South Africa by suspending employees on flimsy 
grounds cause great harm to the integrity of the affected employee and it is for this reason 
that the ruling in the Grootboom matter is welcomed and specially the fact that the 
respondents were ordered to pay the applicant’s costs in the Labour Court as well as his 
necessary disbursements in the Labour Appeal Court, Supreme Court of Appeal and 
Constitutional Court, jointly and severally.   
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CHAPTER 4 
 
SUSPENSIONS IN THE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTOR 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Employers are frequently faced with situations where a decision must be made whether or not 
an employee that was allegedly involved in misconduct should be suspended. Item 4 of 
Schedule 8 of the LRA call for employers to conduct an investigation prior to taking disciplinary 
action against an employee, and in order to do that, the employer may suspend an employee 
pending the outcome of a hearing.  
 
4.2 THE NEED TO SUSPEND 
 
Particularly in situations where the employee may interfere with evidence, or intimidate 
witnesses, or where the employee’s presence at work may represent a threat to order, a 
suspension may be called for. The law as such allows that an employer may suspend an 
employee pending a disciplinary enquiry. There are nevertheless certain preconditions: 
 
4.2.1 
 
Length of suspension 
Suspension pending a disciplinary enquiry must be on full pay and as such it is a costly 
exercise. Essentially the employer pays the employee not to work. Consequently, from a 
cost point of view, suspensions should only be long enough to enable the allegations 
against an employee to be investigated properly. Except when a case is exceptionally 
complicated or where special circumstances exist, suspension pending an enquiry should 
normally not exceed a two week period. In most cases it ought to be just long enough to 
conclude the disciplinary investigation and to allow the employee adequate time to prepare. 
 
In the case of Mapulane v Madibeng Municipality,60
                                                 
60(J20/2020) [2010] ZALC 9. 
 a municipal manager was suspended for 
more than six months without a disciplinary enquiry being set up. The LC held that the 
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suspension had not been terminated and that the municipality retained its right to continue 
with the disciplinary investigation. 
 
4.2.2 
 
Reasonable grounds to justify suspension 
There need to be reasonable grounds to believe that should the employee not be 
suspended, he or she could: 
 
(i) repeat the offence (for instance embezzling money or stealing goods);  
 
(ii) threaten witnesses (especially in cases of organized theft); 
 
(iii) interfere with evidence (for instance deleting computer files). 
 
It may also be necessary to suspend an employee so as to diffuse a conflict situation, for 
example, where an employee has been accused of doing something by a group of employees 
who are threatening violent behaviour against the employee. 
 
4.3 THE RIGHT TO BE HEARD 
 
Employees must be given an opportunity to explain why they should not be suspended. This is 
most important, and failure to do could establish a breach of the audi alteram partem rule 
rendering a suspension procedurally unfair. 
 
It is trite that the principle of fairness and the balancing of competing interests underpin the audi 
rule. It would be unfair if a decision maker could merely make a decision which adversely affects 
another, not hearing the other party's side. In Muller & others v Chairman of the Ministers' 
Council: House of Representatives & others,61
 
 the Court found that the state had unfairly 
suspended four striking workers, as they were not given an opportunity to make representations 
before the decision was taken. In this regard Howie J stated as follows:  
 
                                                 
61 1992 (2) SA 508 (C). 
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“ [T]he denial of such a right would operate with startling unfairness in some instances. What 
about the personal and social implications for the senior officer of 20 years' standing, with an 
impressive record of reliable service, who is a person of prominence and generally high esteem in 
his community? What about the financial implications for an officer with a young family to 
support…? If the respondents' answer is that suspension would not be ordered in such instances 
… [i]t follows that the audi rule ought to have been observed… Firstly, the decision may be 
entirely unnecessary (the other party may provide a perfectly acceptable explanation for the 
alleged transgression), or the decision may be irrational and unjustifiable and indicate an abuse 
of power. The LC is very alive to the weapon of suspension wielded by some employers for 
ulterior motives to exclude unpopular employees from the workplace, and will come to an 
employee's defence in such circumstances.”62
 
  
In the unreported case Setlhoane & Others v Department of Education North West Province & 
Others,63
 
 the LC found the suspension of the employees concerned to be unfair, and ordered 
that they be allowed to return to work. The Court stated as follows: 
“The prejudice an employee may suffer as a result of suspension is not limited to financial loss, 
especially where suspension is linked to suspicions of misconduct. In these cases, the integrity 
and dignity of the employee are also assailed.” 
 
The Court added that pre-suspension hearings are not intended to give an employee the 
opportunity to establish their innocence. Its purpose is to let employees have a say in why they 
should not be suspended.  
 
The LC has in numerous decisions found that an employee must be given an opportunity to 
make representations before the employer taking a decision to suspend him or her. In Dince & 
others v Department of Education, North West Province & others,64 Molahlehi J, quoting Zondo 
AJP (as he was then) in Modise & others v Steve's Spar Blackheath,65
 
 made it clear that:  
                                                 
62 See for example Mogothle v Premier of Northwest Province & another (2009) 30 ILJ 605 (LC) at para 38 in which 
Van Niekerk J stated “[there is a] trend apparent in this court in which employers tend to regard suspension as a 
legitimate measure of first resort to the most groundless suspicion of misconduct, or worse still, to view suspension 
as a convenient mechanism to marginalize an employee who has fallen from favour”.  
63J2234/09 & J213/09 5/11/2009. 
64 [2010] 6 BLLR 631 (LC). 
65 (2000) 21 ILJ 519 (LAC).  
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“The audi rule is part of the rules of natural justice which are deeply entrenched in our law. In 
essence the audi rule calls for the hearing of the other party's side of the story before a decision 
can be taken which may prejudicially affect such party's rights or interests”.66
 
 
Molahlehi J dismissed the employer’s application for leave to appeal against an earlier decision 
that the suspensions of members of the employer's senior management team were unfair and 
illegal unfair. The Judge concluded: 
 
“[45] The respondents [the department] failed to comply with the rules of natural justice in that the 
applicants were suspended without being given a hearing before a decision that would deny them 
the right to their work and undermine their dignity was taken. 
 
[46] I am, accordingly, not persuaded that there are prospects that another court in considering 
the matter may come to a different conclusion to the one reached by myself.” 
 
In Dladla v Council of Mbombela Local Municipality & another,67
 
 the LC found that 
representations could be made after the decision to suspend had been made, provided the 
employer was open to persuasion. In that case the contract of employment stipulated that “[t]he 
municipal manager shall…be notified in writing of his suspension and shall be entitled to 
respond to the allegations within seven working days.” Moshoana AJ stated that the suspension 
was with pay and as the employee could not demonstrate a right to work, he therefore suffered 
little prejudice. The application to interdict the suspension was refused. 
It can be argued that representations made after the decision has been taken compromise the 
audi rule. The representations would have to be of a compelling nature to convince a decision 
maker to change his or her mind and reverse the original decision. Therefore, the right to be 
heard before a decision is made is the more significant option to enable the decision maker to 
weigh up the representations made by both parties, and then make a fair decision. 
 
As stated, an employee should be afforded an opportunity to respond in the event of a punitive 
suspension but it is not necessarily the case with preventive suspensions.  Employers can use 
                                                 
66 At para 34.  
67 (2008) 29 ILJ 1902 LC) 
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the test as to whether the audi alteram partem principle should apply as set out by Corbett CJ in 
Administrator, Transvaal & Others v Traub & Others:68
 
 
“The maxim expresses a principle of natural justice which is part of our law.  The classic 
formulations of the principle state that, when a statute empowers a public official of body to give a 
decision, prejudicially affecting an individual in his liberty or property or existing rights, the latter 
has a right to be heard before a decision is taken (or in some instances thereafter – see 
Chikane’s case supra at 379G), unless the statute expressly or by implication indicates the 
contrary.” 
 
Though the above-mentioned case is from the Administrative Law, the same principles should 
apply in the Labour Law as in the case of the legitimate expectation. 
 
It follows that an employee cannot make representations concerning an imminent suspension if 
he or she does not know the reasons for the suspension. In Baloyi v Department of 
Communications & others,69
 
 the allegations were expressed poorly, as follows: “You are called 
upon to show cause why you should not be suspended pending a special investigation into the 
allegations of irregular appointments of staff, favouritism, corrupt and fraudulent activities.” 
When the employee requested further particulars the request was ignored. In this regard 
Molahlehi J stated as follows:  
“Turning to the facts of the present case, it cannot be said that the applicant was afforded a 
proper opportunity to make representations about the pending decision to suspend her. ... The 
allegations made against the applicant are very wide, vague and fail to state when the incidents 
they are based on occurred. ... [A]s a general principle the applicant was entitled as of right to be 
given information which should have indicated the basis of the suspension. It is that information, 
properly presented to the applicant that would have assisted her in formulating and making a 
meaningful representation in response to those allegations. Without being placed in possession 
of the details of the alleged misconduct or irregularities the applicant was denied the right to be 
heard before her suspension.”70
 
 
                                                 
68(1998) (4) SA 731 (A). 
69 (2010) 31 ILJ 1142 (LC). 
70 At para 30. 
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To prevent unfair suspension, the process must allow for a preliminary investigation during 
which the employee is asked to give an explanation for the alleged misconduct, before charges 
are drafted. If following this, if it is decided to suspend the employee; the employee must still be 
afforded an opportunity to explain why he or she should not be suspended.  
 
Nevertheless, it is important that the person issuing the notice of the enquiry considers the 
employee’s arguments. Should it be decided to proceed with the suspension, in spite of the 
employee’s arguments, the reasons for not accepting the employee’s arguments must be 
thought through, documented, and explained to the employee.  This will prevent problems about 
procedural unfairness. 
 
In summation, the audi principle is decisive to a fair suspension process. The employer needs to 
inform the employee of the nature of the allegations in adequate detail to enable the employee 
to make representations concerning those allegations. The representations should rather be 
made before, instead of after the decision being taken. Representations in writing would do. 
 
4.4 THE REQUIREMENT OF FAIR DEALING 
 
Mogothle v Premier of the Northwest Province & others,71
 
 concerns the suspension of the 
Deputy Director-General of the Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Development in 
the North West Province. The employee was suspended by the MEC pending an investigation 
into allegations that he had approved a state grant to a body in which he and his family had an 
interest. Mogothle was not afforded the opportunity to make representations as to why he 
should not be suspended.  The employee then approached the LC on an urgent basis, seeking 
for his suspension to be uplifted; relying on a contractual right to the audi alteram partem 
principle which provides for the right to be heard before a decision is taken that is adverse to a 
person’s rights or interests. Mogothle did not rely on the LRA, but rather based his claim on a 
contractual right meaning that the MEC and the Premier breached their contractual 
responsibility to deal with him fairly. It requires the following: 
(i) That the employer has a justifiable reason to believe that the employee has engaged 
in severe misconduct. 
                                                 
71(2009) 30 ILJ 605 (LC). 
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(ii) That there is an objectively valid reason to deny the employee access to the 
workplace, founded on the integrity of any impending investigation into the alleged 
misconduct, or some other related issue that would place the investigation or the 
interests of affected parties at risk. 
 
(iii) That the employee is afforded the opportunity to state a case prior to the employer 
making any final decision on suspending the employee.72
 
 
Van Niekerk J decided that he could consider Mogothle’s claim in the LC since the 
Constitutional Court (CC) case of Chirwa73
 
 did not remove the contractual rights of which an 
employee can enforce either in the LC or the HC. Every employment contract requires that the 
employer treat the employee fairly which meant that an employee could only be suspended for a 
fair reason and following a fair procedure. As the employee was not afforded a hearing prior to 
his suspension the suspension was found to be procedurally unfair and the MEC was supposed 
to have afforded him an opportunity to state his case before the decision was made to suspend 
him.         
The LC stated that, suspending an employee whilst awaiting an inquiry regarding an alleged 
misconduct is equal to an arrest and should thus only be considered when undeniably essential. 
The test for a fair suspension is thus whether there is an apparent case against the employee, 
whether there is judicious concern that the employee will interfere with investigations or 
presents some other threat, and whether the employee was afforded a fair opportunity to make 
representation before being suspended.74
 
 
In the case of POPCRU obo Masemola & Others v Minister of Correctional Services,75
                                                 
72Rudi Kuhn, Article on precautionary suspensions by the employer, May 2010.  
 the LC 
set aside a preventative suspension where the employee was not afforded an opportunity to 
state his case prior to a decision being taken. The Court took into consideration that the 
suspension negatively affected the employee's reputation, dignity, integrity and job security. The 
Employer had violated the employee's rights by not affording him the opportunity to be heard 
before the suspension was implemented. 
73Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (4) SA 367 (CC). 
74Grogan J, Employment Rights. Page 133. 
75(2010) 31 ILJ 412 (LC). 
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An employer is obligated to afford the employee a reasonable opportunity to state a case 
against the suspension. This need not be a full-scale hearing and would be depended on the 
circumstances of the employer, the accusations against the employee, and whether or not the 
employer’s disciplinary code provides any direction on the issue.  
 
4.5 THE PRE-SUSPENSION DISCUSSION 
 
There are presently two approaches to the suspension question. The first is to notify the 
employee in writing of the employer’s intention (and reasons) to suspend the employee based 
on the outcome of the preliminary investigation. The employee is invited to present reasons to 
the employer, normally within 24 or 48 hours, that may be taken into account prior to a final 
decision being reached concerning the suspension of the employee. This approach is regarded 
as risky, since such a notification serves as a “heads-up” to the employee and allows plentiful 
opportunity for the employee to interfere with evidence, tamper with witnesses and to possibly 
commit further similar acts of misconduct. 
  
The second and much less complicated method is to invite the employee into the boardroom, 
together with a representative from the HR department, and to inform the employee of the 
employer’s suspicions and reasons for contemplating suspension. The employee is afforded the 
opportunity to respond and the employer will then have to deliberate on the submission made by 
the employee. This may be done in cooperation with the HR representative and the employee is 
requested to remain in the boardroom until a (speedy) decision has been reached.  In this 
manner the employee is not unable to cause further harm to the operations of the employer. 
  
4.5.1 
 
Pre-suspension post-discussion checklist 
In the above regard, the following aspects need to be verified after the afore-mentioned 
discussion, prior to a decision being taken about suspension: 
 
(i) Was the employee informed about the reasons for suspension?  
 
(ii) Was the employee allowed an opportunity to provide reasons for not being suspended 
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(iii) Was the employee informed of the duration of the period of suspension, and is it a 
reasonable period (normally not more than 14 to 30 days)?  
 
(iv) Was it explained to the employee what would happen at the end of the period of 
suspension, or as soon as the investigation has been completed? 
 
4.6 SUSPENSION WITH OR WITHOUT PAY 
 
Suspension is always as a rule on full pay unless the employee agrees to suspension without 
pay, or where statute specifically allows for it. In Sappi Forests (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others,76
 
 
Pillay J ruled as follows: 
“[T]he position at common law has always been that an employer who suspends an employee 
without pay commits a breach of the contract of employment. An employer may suspend an 
employee without pay if the employee so agrees, or legislation or a collective agreement 
authorises the suspension.”  
 
The employee in Sappi requested that disciplinary action against him be suspended pending the 
conclusion of the criminal proceedings against him and the employer agreed to the request. In 
this case the arbitrator ruled that his remuneration could not be stopped and it was agreed upon 
in the reviewing LC. 
  
Currently there are categories of statutory employees, such as members of the SAPS and some 
public servants, as well as municipal employees, that may be suspended without remuneration 
pending an inquiry, since their legal conditions of service specifically provide for suspension 
without remuneration, however this may be found to be unconstitutional.77
 
 
One could assume that the legislature recognised suspension to be fair in some circumstances; 
since they have identified that possible unfair conduct relating to suspension could lead to 
possible unfair labour practices. This affords the employee the opportunity to seek relief in 
cases where it can be proven that the conduct relating to the suspension was unfair, or that the 
suspension itself was unjustified and an arbitrator has the power to examine the procedure that 
                                                 
76[2009] 3 BLLR 254 (LC). 
77Grogan J 2010. Employment Rights. Page 131. 
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was followed before the decision to suspend the employee, or the facts on which the decision 
itself was based. 
 
There are various reasons why employers suspend their employees as already alluded to. In 
the case of the preventive suspension the intention of the employer would be to remove the 
employee from the workplace temporarily, pending disciplinary action. Under these 
circumstances the employers choose to suspend the employee before he or she actually had an 
opportunity to state his or her case. Employers could present several reasons to defend this 
conduct, such as that the continued presence of the employee may be detrimental or 
threatening to legitimate business interests78 or that the continued presence of the employee 
may be detrimental to the investigation into the allegations against the employee. In Phutiyagae 
v Tswaing Local Municipality,79 Mokgoatlheng AJ remarked:80
 
 
“The applicant is suspended with full pay and benefits, his suspension are a holding operation 
intended as an interim measure undertaken for accountable and transparent governance whilst 
the respondent is conducting investigations pending a disciplinary enquiry if such proceedings are 
justifiable. The prejudice the respondent will suffer, is far greater than the potential prejudice. If 
any, the applicant will suffer; all the applicant has to do is remain on suspension whilst the 
investigations are proceeding” 
 
During this kind of suspension, the employee’s remuneration is not to be stopped,81 and is only 
allowed if intended to enable the employer to investigate the charges against the employee.  
The holding suspension always happens preceding a disciplinary hearing and it is with the 
enjoyment of all benefits for the employee.82 Legal conditions of service or even a contract of 
employment may explicitly provide for suspension without pay.83
 
 
It is quite clear from the afore-mentioned that employees may only be suspended without pay, 
should they agree. An instance would be suspension without pay as a substitute for dismissal. 
The line of reasoning is that the employee made continued employment intolerable and that as a 
                                                 
78Du Plessis & Fouche 2006 page 307. 
792006 15 (LC) 6.4.1. 
80At par 35-36. 
81Du Plessis & Fouche 2006 page 307. It is submitted that the payment of wages/salary must continue until such time 
as when a final decision (after enquiry/disciplinary hearing has been held) is reached. 
82 M Conradie & J Deacon, Journal for Juridical Science 2009:34(1). 
83Grogan 2007A: 62, Dismissal, discrimination and unfair labour practices. Cape Town: Juta.  Grogan refers to 
policemen, some public servants and municipal employees. 
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last effort to correct the behaviour of the employee, the employer presented suspension without 
pay as an option to terminating the relationship of employment. In County Fair v CCMA & 
Others,84 and also in South African Breweries Ltd (Beer Division) v Woolfrey& Others,85
 
 it was 
found that suspension without pay is a permitted disciplinary sanction where suitable. It is 
nonetheless recommended that such a sanction is subject to the employee signing a “sanction 
by agreement” letter. 
 
4.7 PREJUDICE SUFFERED DUE TO SUSPENSION 
 
To be falsely accused of wrongdoing can be most traumatic as it creates distrust. Even though 
no steps are ultimately taken against the employee, the suspicion may remain which can affect 
the employee’s standing and long term career possibilities. This is one reason for proper 
investigation into incidents prior to bring charges of misconduct. 
 
In spite of the fact that a holding suspension is on full pay, it is accepted that the employee may 
still suffer prejudice as a result of being suspended, due to the impact that it may have on the 
employee's integrity, dignity, reputation and status in the community.  
 
The following two cases are good examples of the prejudice suffered by employees due to 
suspension. 
 
4.7.1 
 
SA Post Office Ltd v Jansen van Vuuren NO & others 
In SA Post Office Ltd v Jansen van Vuuren NO & others,86
  
 the employee, a senior systems 
programmer, was suspended on full pay when failing to provide a satisfactory explanation for an 
electricity outage in an area where he had been authorized to perform certain tasks on the 
employer’s servers. He was called to attend a disciplinary enquiry and was issued a final written 
warning for making changes in the production environment without proper authorization.  
At the CCMA the commissioner found that the employee had been suspected of causing the 
outage merely because of his presence in the server room, and that the employer had placed 
                                                 
84[1998] 6 BLLR 577 (LC). 
85[1999] 5 BLLR 525 (LC). 
86(2008) 29 ILJ 2793 (LC). 
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the burden on him to prove that he was not responsible for the outage. The commissioner 
further found that the charges against the employee had been particularly vague and indicated 
no misconduct. Furthermore, the plea of guilty by the employee did not indicate an explicit 
admission of guilt by him. The commissioner concluded that the warning issued by the employer 
represented an unfair labour practice.  
  
Concerning the suspension of the employee, the commissioner found it to represent a separate 
unfair labour practice, on the grounds that the employee was not aware of the nature of the 
offence he was supposed to have committed, and was not afforded an opportunity to make 
representations about his suspension. The commissioner awarded Jansen van Vuuren six 
months’ compensation, having reasoned that the suspension prejudices an employee 
psychologically, socially and in terms of future job prospects.  
  
4.7.2 
 
MEC for Education, North West Provincial Government v Gradwell 
In the quite recent decision in MEC for Education, North West Provincial Government v 
Gradwell,87
 
 the LAC appeared to have spoken the final word on the holding of a suspension 
hearing before suspending an employee pending a disciplinary investigation, also referred to as 
a "holding suspension". This has been the issue of various conflicting LC decisions. As stated, 
in a holding suspension, employees are suspended on full pay, normally where the employer is 
concerned about some interference from the employee in its operations, or the employee 
meddling in its enquiries during or pending a disciplinary investigation. 
Gradwell brought an urgent application in the LC, contesting his suspension as acting head of 
the Department of Education of the North West Provincial Government, pending an investigation 
into charges that he had engaged in grave misconduct. The LC found his suspension to be 
unlawful as there was no objectively justified reason to deny Gradwell access to the workplace, 
and seeing as he had not been given an appropriate opportunity to be heard before being 
placed on suspension. The LC granted the interdict. 
On appeal the LAC was called on to decide whether or not there was a legal foundation 
justifying Gradwell's suspension, as well as whether or not the employer had complied with the 
right to be heard when imposing the suspension. 
                                                 
87(2012) 33 ILJ 2033 (LAC). 
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It was contended that Gradwell had caused a former privately-owned institution, which provided 
care to severely intellectually disabled children and young adults, to be registered as a public 
school, when it was not a school. It was further contended that there were substantial 
accounting wrongdoing, unaccounted-for monies and directorships held by Gradwell in 
construction companies that were to provide services to this organization. Before his 
suspension Gradwell was requested to provide his employer with reasons why he should not be 
suspended. According to Gradwell, he needed time and access to prepare a response, and that 
could not do so within the time frame afforded to him. He was given more time, which he 
however did not believe to be sufficient. Gradwell did not provide any reasons why he should 
not be suspended, and he was suspended.  
   
The LAC found that the justification of a suspension relies on the existence of a reason which, 
on the face of it, establishes a belief that the employee committed severe misconduct. A second 
line of enquiry is then necessary to deal with the justification in denying the employee access to 
the workplace.  The relevant considerations would be the nature, likelihood and seriousness of 
the claimed misconduct.    
 
On the second issue before the Court, namely whether or not the employer failed to complied 
with the right to be heard, the Court acknowledged that there was no agreement in the case law 
as to the nature and extent of an employee's right to be heard before being suspended.  The 
Court found that the common law concerning the contract of employment - in cases where it 
does not contain a contractual entitlement to a hearing before suspension - had not developed 
to a point where such a right could be read into the employment contract. The Court found that 
the right to be heard emanated from the LRA, as it forms part of the duty of the employer not to 
subject an employee to unfair labour practices. It is therefore a statutory right with statutory 
remedies. Unfair labour practices should consequently be dealt with by the CCMA or the 
appropriate bargaining council. 
The Court found Gradwell's suspension to be lawful and fair. The Court found that where an 
employee is given the opportunity to make written submissions on why a holding suspension 
should not be implemented, this would in the normal course be adequate and enough 
compliance with the requirement of procedural fairness. 
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The employer’s decision to suspend will vastly depend on the circumstances concerning the 
alleged misconduct, and an employee should not be suspended unless there is prima facie 
justification for believing that the employee has perpetrated serious misconduct, and that there 
is some independently justified reason for barring the employee from the workplace.  
 
4.8 CONCLUSION 
 
There may be cases where suspension is essential while enquiries are carried out, for example 
(i) where relationships have severely broken down, in cases of gross misconduct, or (ii) where 
there are risks to an employee’s or the company’s property, or (iii) responsibilities to third 
parties, and (iv) in circumstances where there are reasonable grounds for concern that evidence 
has been tampered with or destroyed, or (v) witnesses possibly being intimidated. 
 
However, suspension should only be imposed after careful contemplation and needs to be 
reviewed to ensure it is not protracted without cause.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
PROTRACTED SUSPENSIONS IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE 
 
Since a major concern about suspensions in the Public Service is the excessive lengths thereof, 
and the financial implications thereof, the approach to this chapter is to focus specifically on 
those aspects of suspensions. 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In the period leading up to 1994, the structure for employment labour relations in South Africa 
was set in terms of the Labour Relations Act (1956 LRA),88 which had copious successive 
amendments to it. The 1956 LRA did not prescribe on issues concerning preventive 
suspensions. The 1956 LRA was later replaced with the Labour Relations Act,89 (LRA), and 
other new legislation on employment law in the Public Service, amongst others, the Public 
Service Act.90
 
 The LRA brought with it the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal, which present 
guidelines on dealing with disciplinary matters. Item 1(3) of the Code provides that “[w]hile 
employees should be protected from arbitrary action, employers are entitled to satisfactory 
conduct and work performance from their employees”. The Code also stipulates that employers 
may to adopt disciplinary rules which determine the conduct that is required from their 
employees. 
Compliant with the stipulations of the LRA, the (now repealed) section 22(7) of the Public 
Service Act prescribed that “an officer may, at any time before or after he or she has been 
charged under this section, be suspended from duty on such conditions as may be 
prescribed6.”The regulations in terms of this section (later also repealed) provided that “an 
officer who has been suspended from duty in terms of section 22(7) of the Act shall not receive 
any emoluments during the period of his suspension: provided that the head of department may 
in his or her discretion direct that the emoluments be paid to the officer, in full or in part”. In the 
place of the said repealed section 22(7), Resolution 2 of 1999 was negotiated and agreed upon 
in the Public Service Coordinating Bargaining Council, bringing about the Disciplinary Code and 
Procedure for the Public Service (the Disciplinary Code).  
                                                 
8828 of 1956. 
8966 of 1995. 
90103 of 1994. 
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Item 7.2 of the Disciplinary Code makes provision for the suspension of an employee as a 
preventive measure. It is common cause that the preventive suspension of employees in the 
Public Service is definitely a necessary tool, in particular where the allegations being 
investigated are of a severe nature. The preventive suspension allows the employer to conduct 
an investigation without any concern of interfering with the process or pressurizing of potential 
witnesses in the workplace. Nevertheless, in the Public Service, such preventive suspension of 
employees must be on full pay, the reason being that in terms of section 23(1) of the 
Constitution, every employee has the right to fair labour practice, including to be presumed 
innocent until proven guilty. As such, contrary to the period before 1997, before the repeal of the 
said section 22(7), when a head of department could in his or her own discretion direct whether 
or not the suspended employee’s salary should be paid. 
 
According to Professor Carole Cooper, an Associate Professor, attached to the Centre of 
Applied Legal Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand, in the period before 1994 “in 
adjudicating the individual rights disputes before it, the Industrial Court developed over time a 
jurisprudential standard of fairness that required that both the employer’s commercial interests 
and the legitimate workplace interests of the employees be taken into account. In essence the 
employer’s conduct in the realm of individual rights had to be based on a fair reason and 
executed in terms of a fair procedure”.91
 
 
In the era before our current constitutional dispensation, government departments could rely on 
the law of precedents for guidance on whether or not to suspend an employee without pay. So, 
for instance, in the case of Jacobs en andere v Die Minister van Justisie en andere,92
 
 the Court 
found that “to suspend an employee cannot be objectively judged, and can only be set aside if it 
so grossly unreasonable as to justify the conclusion that the decision maker was mala fide” or 
failed to properly apply his or her mind to all relevant facts. In such instances “the onus rested 
on an employee to prove on the balance of probabilities that the decision to suspend without 
pay was improperly taken and ought to be set aside”. 
Nonetheless, as stated, the employer is since then required to comply with the Constitution. 
 
                                                 
91 Professor Cooper in her article titled “Right to fair labour practice” 2005199, confirming the situation which 
prevailed before section 23 of the Constitution of Republic of South Africa became applicable.  
92(1992) 13 ILJ 1136 (C). 
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5.2 THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION’S REPORT ON “MANAGEMENT OF 
SUSPENSIONS IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE”, 2001 
 
The Public Service Commission (PSC) conducted a survey on the management of 
precautionary suspensions in the Public Service, published during 2001 (the 2001 report).93
 
 
The 2001 report pointed towards a need for the development of guidelines on the management 
of precautionary suspensions in the Public Service, which were subsequently put in place (the 
Guidelines).94
 
 
The Guidelines were inter alia directed at providing government departments with a framework 
to assist in the drafting of internal departmental policies on the management of preventive 
suspensions. Even though the PSC drew up the Guidelines during 2002, followed up with 
countrywide workshops, unfortunately there was no further follow-up on the findings and the 
implementation of the recommendations of the 2001 report. 
 
In terms of Resolution 2 of 1999 a disciplinary hearing was intended to be held within a month 
from the date of suspension of an employee. Resolution 1 of 2003 subsequently amended the 
provision and extended the maximum suspension period to 60 days.  According to the said two 
Resolutions,95
 
 the employer may suspend the services of an employee on full pay when the 
employee is alleged to have committed a serious offence, and the employer believes that the 
presence of an employee at the workplace might: (i) jeopardize any investigation into the 
alleged misconduct, or (ii) endanger the wellbeing or safety of any person or state property. 
5.3 GUIDELINES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF PRECAUTIONARY SUSPENSIONS, 2002 
 
In view of the afore-mentioned, it is appropriate to consider the contents of the Guidelines.96
 
 
 
 
                                                 
93Public Service Commission’s report on “Management of suspensions in the Public Service as from 1 July 1999 until 
31 July2000”, published in 2001, and Public Service Commission’s report on “Management of suspensions in the 
Public Service for the financial years 2008/2009 and 2009/2010”, published in 2011. 
94Public Service Commission’s 2002 “Guidelines on management of precautionary suspensions” published in 2001. 
95PSCBC Resolution 2 of 1999 Clause 7.2, which is the same as in PSCBC Resolution 1 of 2003. 
96Public Service Commission’s 2002 “Guidelines on management of precautionary suspensions” published in 2001. 
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5.3.1 
 
Purpose of the Guidelines 
As alluded to above, the purpose of the Guidelines is, inter alia, to provide government 
departments with a framework within which they could draw up their own internal policies on the 
effective management of cases of suspension from work. The Guidelines would then also        
(i) provide general principles on the process of suspension and (ii) promote best practices in 
effecting suspension in the public service. 
 
5.3.2 
 
Enacting provisions 
Item 7.2 of the Disciplinary Code and Procedures provides for an employee to be suspended on 
full pay, as a precautionary measure under the following circumstances: 
 
(i) If the employee is suspected to have committed serious misconduct. 
 
(ii) Should the employer have grounds to believe that the presence of an employee at 
work might jeopardize any investigation into the alleged misconduct, or endanger the 
well-being or safety of any person or government property.  
 
5.3.3 
 
The need for departmental policies on the management of suspensions 
Departmental policies on the management of preventive suspensions are necessary to ensure 
that such suspensions are managed in accordance with the principles of administrative justice, 
natural justice and fairness. Maintaining an atmosphere of sound labour relations at work 
necessitates acceptable and fair procedures to be in place and complied with. 
 
Such policies serve a twofold purpose since they afford a framework that allow management to 
maintain acceptable standards, and employees to have access to processes through which 
alleged failures to comply with the set standards may addressed fairly and objectively. 
 
Policies on managing of suspensions ought to be in writing agreed to by labour and be made 
available to employees. The essentials of such procedures are that the foundation for the 
suspension is clear, that the reasons for suspension are well described, that the employee is 
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notified of the decision and the reasons for the decision, and that the employee has the 
opportunity to respond to the imminent suspension. 
 
5.3.4 
 
Policy statement 
As soon as an internal policy on the management of suspensions is agreed on, government 
departments must, as an initial step, issue a policy statement to employees, specifying the 
process to be followed when suspending an employee, until instituting disciplinary steps. 
 
5.3.5 
 
Grounds for suspension 
Item 7.2 of the Disciplinary Code stipulates the circumstances under which an employee may be 
suspended on full pay. A decision to suspend must be taken with care, considering the 
prevailing circumstances.  
 
There are effectively two issues to consider when suspending an employee, namely: 
 
(i) Reasonable suspicion of misconduct. Suspension may be proper once an initial 
investigation has found a sufficient basis for belief that serious misconduct may have 
taken place. Consequently, a decision to suspend should not be a mere knee-jerk result 
of suspicion of serious misconduct. 
 
(ii) Reasonable belief that the employee may interfere. Should a reasonable basis for 
believing that the presence of the employee at work might interfere with the 
investigation, including witnesses and evidence, the suspension of the employee should 
be a last resort to guarantee the continued progress of the disciplinary process. 
 
Suspension must only be considered a preventive measure, where the continued presence of 
the employee at work is unacceptable, due to one or more of the following reasons: 
 
(i) The efficient operation of the employer. 
 
(ii) The public interest. 
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(iii) The interests of the employee. 
 
(iv) The interests of the employee’s fellow employees. 
 
(v)  A reasonable and objective concern by the employer that there is a realistic 
likelihood of the misconduct recurring. 
 
Internal departmental policies on the management of suspensions must include a list of serious 
misbehaviour that may result in a preventive suspension considered by the employer. 
 
5.3.6 
 
The process followed when considering the suspension of an employee 
Departments/provincial administrations should put in place clear processes to manage 
suspensions. These processes need to ensure that the management of suspensions takes 
place in an efficient and effective manner and that the rules of natural justice are complied with. 
 
As an initial step, the employer should apply its mind as to whether or not grounds exist for the 
suspension of the employee, founded on the serious nature of the transgression, and then take 
into account whether or not the employee should be allowed to continue his or her duties. 
 
Should there be grounds for suspension the employer should, as the next step, founded on the 
distinctive circumstances of each case, contemplate the forms of suspension. 
 
After contemplating the above-mentioned factors, the employer should schedule an informal 
meeting with the employee. The employee must be informed of the following: 
 
(i) The date, time and venue of the meeting. 
 
(ii) The planned action by the employer. 
 
(iii) The accusations that led to the proposed action. 
 
(iv) During the meeting the employee will be given the opportunity to make 
representations on why suspension is not appropriate. 
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(v) The employee has the right to be represented as provided for in the Disciplinary 
Code. 
 
(vi) Should the employee not be availed the opportunity to make representations at the 
meeting, an opportunity will be given to submit written representations by a certain 
date and time. 
 
An official from the Employee Relations component may attend the meeting in a consultative 
capacity. 
 
Subsequent to the meeting, the employee’s representations, if any, should be carefully 
considered by the delegated authority, to ensure that there is satisfactory evidence or valid 
reasons for the suspension. 
 
As soon as a final decision has been taken, the decision should be made known to the 
employee in writing, and the notice should hold the following information: 
 
(i) The decision by the designated official holding the delegated authority. 
 
(ii) The reasons why the employer saw fit to suspend the employee, considering the 
representations by the employee. 
 
(iii) The possible length of the suspension. 
 
(iv) The conditions of access to the workplace and other conditions, during the period of 
the suspension. 
 
(v) An indication that the suspension will be reviewed on a particular date. 
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5.3.7 
 
Review of suspension 
Where the initial 30-day period of suspension has to be extended as a result of the fact that a 
hearing was not held within the stipulated period, the suspension should be reviewed at regular 
intervals, namely weekly or monthly. 
 
The designated delegated authority should establish whether the initial reasons for the 
suspension are still current in the prevailing circumstances. This evaluation may be done in 
consultation with the chairperson of the disciplinary investigation. 
 
If it is decided that the suspension needs to be extended, the employee must be informed of the 
reasons for the further extension and provided an opportunity to make representations. 
 
The reasons for the extension, and the employee’s response, if any, should be carefully 
reviewed by the designated delegated authority, to ensure that there are sufficient reasons to 
extend the suspension. 
 
The suspension should be lifted when the employer no longer believes that the suspension is in 
the public interest or in the employer’s interest, or when the reasons for the suspension are no 
longer valid. 
 
The disciplinary process should, despite of the decision to lift a suspension, be continued with 
and finalized. 
 
Where an investigation into alleged misconduct finds no bases for a allegation of misconduct, it 
is considered necessary to give written notice of termination of suspension, effective from a 
specific date, which may show that no grounds for a charge of misconduct were found to exist 
and that no further steps will be taken. 
 
5.3.8 
 
Record keeping 
The employer must keep full record of each suspended employee, specifying the following: 
 
(i) The nature of the alleged misconduct. 
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(ii) The reasons for the suspension. 
 
(iii) The period of suspension. 
 
(iv) The financial implications of the suspension. 
 
(v) The written notifications of the suspension. 
 
(vi) Responses from the employee concerning the suspension. 
 
(vii) The reasons for the extension of the suspension. 
 
The disciplinary process should, despite the decision to lift a suspension, be continued with and 
finalized. 
 
In cases where an investigation into alleged misconduct finds no substance for a charge of 
misconduct, it is preferable to give written notice of the termination of suspension, in force from 
a particular date, which may indicate that no basis for a charge of misconduct were established 
and that no further steps will be taken. 
 
 
5.4 THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION’S REPORT ON “MANAGEMENT OF 
SUSPENSIONS IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE”, 2011 
 
When it became very apparent that the Guidelines, set up nearly a decade earlier, proved to be 
ineffective, the PSC launched yet another investigation into the “management of suspensions in 
the Public Service”, which were published in 2011 (the 2011 report).97
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
97Public Service Commission’s report on “Management of suspensions in the Public Service for the financial years 
2008/2009and 2009/2010”, published in 2011. 
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5.4.1 
 
The objectives of the 2011 report 
 
This study was conducted to review the management of precautionary suspensions in the 
Public Service and to, inter alia, address the following relevant questions: 
 
(i) The circumstances under which employees were placed on precautionary 
suspensions in the sampled departments. 
 
(ii) Establishing if the sampled departments were compliant or non-compliant with the 
prescribed 60 days period for precautionary suspensions in the Public Service. 
 
(iii) Determining the cost implications to the employer of placing employees under the 
precautionary suspensions in the Public Service. 
 
(iv) Finding out if the sampled departments, during the investigation of the case and/or 
when the disciplinary procedure is underway, considered the transfer of employees 
as an alternative to placing employees under precautionary suspension. 
(v) Verifying whether the sampled departments had internal policies to sensitize 
employees and key role-players on the processes relating to the disciplinary 
procedure and preventive suspensions. 
 
(vi) Establishing the role of the said departments’ labour relations components in the 
management of preventive suspensions. 
 
(vii) The extent to which the sampled departments’ HR components gave training and 
advisory support service concerning the management of preventive suspension. 
 
5.4.2 
 
The findings of the 2011 report 
The government departments sampled by the PSC during the 2011 report, indicated that for the 
financial years 2008/2009 and 2009/2010, a total amount of R21 004 160.00 was paid out to 
employees on precautionary suspensions pending finalization of disciplinary cases against 
them. 
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The findings of the 2011 report pointed towards very serious shortcomings concerning the 
management of precautionary suspensions in the Public Service. It uncovered serious 
inconsistencies amongst sampled departments, which was probably symptomatic of the 
situation across all other departments.  
 
The 2011 report had highlighted how departments managed precautionary suspensions during 
the two periods under review. It was clear from the responses received and documents studied 
that there had been widespread non-compliance with the prescripts relating to the management 
of precautionary suspensions. Most of the departments have not developed their internal 
policies in line with Resolution 1 of 2003. This led to the departments incurring higher financial 
losses remunerating employees who are not rendering their services, which would not have 
been so had the departments developed a procedure through which they could monitor and 
ensure that the periods are not over extended. The provincial departments that participated in 
the study had paid R15 513 978.84 to the employees who had been suspended pending the 
disciplinary hearings. The national departments that participated in the study paid out an 
amount of R7 963 028.33. Since the 2011 report focused on the sampled departments, the 
financial losses incurred was only a fraction of the true state of affairs in the Public Service for 
the period under review. 
 
5.4.3 
 
Report to the Portfolio Committee 
During May 2012 the PSC and the Department of Public Service and Administration made a 
presentation to the Portfolio Committee on Public Service and Administration.  
 
It was reported that during 2010/2011, 1559 employees in national departments were placed on 
precautionary suspension.  
The majority of those employees were from the SA Police Service (869), and the Department of 
Correctional Services (471). Payment of salaries to the said 1559 employees on suspension 
came close to R51.2 million.98
 
 
                                                 
98 Anonymous “High level of public service suspensions and the delay in completing investigations: Update by the 
Department of Public Service and Administration & the Public Service Commission” (02052012) 
<www.pmg.org.za/report/> (accessed 27-112013).  
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The PSC listed the typical reasons for placing employees on suspension as being for financial 
misconduct, insubordination, failure to bank state monies, gross negligence resulting in loss of 
state monies, theft, drunken driving, misuse of state property, fraud, corruption, keeping 
dangerous weapons, sexual harassment, unauthorized expenditure, and violation of tender 
procedures. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
It appears that a great number of employers experience uncertainty as to whether and when to 
suspend. Cognisance should be taken of the implications of the two different categories of 
suspensions, and to clearly differentiate between precautionary and punitive suspensions, when 
either of these two options is decided upon during the disciplinary process. Case law has 
assisted in making it clear that this differentiation between the two categories is of vital 
importance. 
 
 
Employers should be consistent in the application of suspension of employees and caution 
should be taken that they do not only treat similar cases similarly, but also act in the similar 
manner in the event of more than one employee being alleged to have been part of the same 
transgression which warrants suspension, each of them should be subjected to possible 
suspension. 
 
The issuing of such guidelines should not discourage or prevent parties to conclude their own 
procedural agreements in this regard.   The inclusion of procedural aspects, like the notice of 
the intention to suspend and issuing of warnings before suspending an employee, reasons for 
suspending an employee, an opportunity for the employee to respond to the suspension and 
proposed timeframes for suspensions, would be of great value. However, caution should be 
taken against the application of a suspension without benefits before a disciplinary hearing.    
 
As stated, suspension is undeniably a crucial instrument when it comes to preservation of 
workplace discipline. The obstacle to get over for a fair suspension is both substantive and 
procedural.99
                                                 
99 Norton “When is a Suspension an Unfair Labour Practice? A Review of Court Decisions” 2013 34 ILJ 1694-1705. 
 As regards substantive fairness, the employer must have prima facie belief that an 
employee has committed serious misconduct; the alleged misconduct must be substantial and 
there must be compelling reasons to justify the removal of the employee from the workplace. As 
regards procedural fairness, the employee must be notified of these substantive elements and 
given an opportunity to make representations to the employer prior to the employer making a 
final decision on whether or not to suspend the employee. Should the employer decide to 
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suspend the employee, then the procedures and time periods set out in regulations, a collective 
agreement or internal workplace policy must be abided with. 
 
To date the courts have found the conduct of employers wanting, mainly because of a failure to 
apply with the procedural aspects concerning a fair suspension. The most common 
contravention in this regard is non-compliance with the audi rule and indifference for relevant 
regulations and workplace policies. The courts are particularly aware of the risk of abuse by 
employers who resort too hastily to suspension when faced with allegations of misconduct 
involving senior employees (especially, as seen often in the public sector, those who have fallen 
out of favour with the powers that be). 
 
Rather less attention has been given by the courts to the question of the nature of the 
misconduct - the substantive part - even when the alleged misconduct is of a serious nature and 
undermines the public interest. The courts have fittingly criticized employers for making blanket 
allegations of misconduct, for instance “fraud, corruption, procurement irregularities”, and for 
failing to give details of those allegations. Nonetheless, the courts have given far less weight to 
the nature of the misconduct and the potential prejudice to the employer when some of those 
details have been given. Having already satisfied themselves that a suspension has not passed 
the procedural fairness test, they possibly look little further, and lift the suspension and reinstate 
the employee. Indeed the weight of justification by the courts, to set aside a suspension and 
reinstate the employee, falls heavily on the procedural part, with comparatively less attention 
afforded to the substantive reasons for the suspension. 
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